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521st Meeting

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1	UNITED S	STATES OF AMERICA	
2	NUCLEAR RE	EGULATORY COMMISSION	
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4	ADVISORY COMMIT	TEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS	
5		(ACRS)	
6	52	21st MEETING	
7		+ + + + +	
8	THURSDAY	Y, APRIL 7, 2005	
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10	ROCKY	JILLE, MARYLAND	
11	The Advisory Cor	nmittee met at 8:30 a.m. at	
12	the Nuclear Regulatory	y Commission, Two White Flint	
13	North, Room T2B3, 1154	5 Rockville Pike, DR. GRAHAM B.	
14	WALLIS, Chairman, pres	siding.	
15	COMMITTEE MEMBERS:		
16	GRAHAM B. WALLIS	Chairman	
17	WILLIAM J. SHACK	Vice-Chairman	
18	MARIO V. BONACA	Chairman	
19	GEORGE E. APOSTOLAKIS	Member	
20	THOMAS S. KRESS	Member	
21	GRAHAM L. LEITCH	Member	
22	DANA A. POWERS	Member	
23	STEPHEN L. ROSEN	Member	
24	VICTOR H. RANSOM	Member	
25	JOHN D. SIEBER	Member	
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1	ACRS STAFF PRESENT:		
2	JOHN T. LARKINS	Director, Designated Federal	
3		Official	
4	MICHAEL L. SCOTT	Chief, Technical Support	
5		Branch	
6	SAM DURAISWAMY		
7	HOSSEIN NOURBAKHSH		
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1	P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S
2	(8:31 a.m.)
3	1) OPENING REMARKS BY THE ACRS CHAIRMAN
4	1.1) OPENING STATEMENT
5	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Good morning. The
6	meeting will now come to order. This is the first day
7	of the 521st meeting of the Advisory Committee on
8	Reactor Safeguards. We will only be meeting for two
9	days. We will not be meeting on Saturday.
10	During today's meeting, the Committee will
11	consider the following: the license renewal
12	application for the Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant,
13	Units 1 and 2; NUREG-1792, "Good Practices for
14	Implementing Human Reliability Analysis"; subcommittee
15	report on the interim review of the license renewal
16	application for Millstone Power Station, Units 2 and
17	3; and the preparation of ACRS Reports.
18	In addition, the Committee will meet with
19	the NRC commissioners between 1:30 and 3:30 in the
20	commissioners' conference room, One White Flint North,
21	to discuss items of mutual interest.
22	This meeting is being conducted in
23	accordance with the provisions of the Federal Advisory

Committee Act. Dr. John T. Larkins is the designated

federal official for the initial portion of the

24

meeting.

We have received no written comments, nor requests for time to make oral statements from members of the public regarding today's sessions. A transcript of portions of the meeting is being kept, and it is requested that the speakers use one of the microphones, identify themselves, and speak with sufficient clarity and volume so that they can be readily heard.

1.2) ITEMS OF CURRENT INTEREST

CHAIRMAN WALLIS: I will begin with some items of current interest. Starting this week, Ashok Thadni has been appointed as the Deputy Executive Director, ACRS/ACNW.

Since May of 2004, Ashok was serving as Director for International Research and Development Projects, reporting to the NRC Chairman. He joined the NRC in 1974. And he has served in a series of progressively more responsible positions in areas dealing with domestic and international nuclear safety issues.

He was Director of the Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research from June '97 until May of 2004. He also served as a Deputy Executive Director for Operations for a year.

1	Ashok will assist the ACRS and ACNW in
2	various significant matters, such as the potential for
3	new reactor licensing and prelicensing activities for
4	a high-level radioactive waste repository at Yucca
5	Mountain.
6	Is Ashok here?
7	MR. THADNI: Yes.
8	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Yes. Please welcome
9	Ashok to the ACRS, ladies and gentlemen.
10	(Applause.)
11	MR. THADNI: Thank you very much.
12	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Another matter of
13	current interest, you'll notice in the handout there
14	are four very interesting speeches by commissioners at
15	the reactor information conference. And at the back
16	end of this package, there is Insight, NRC article on
17	50.46, which looks to me very much like Nucleonics
18	Week article, which some of you may already have read.
19	Now let's get down with the real business.
20	And I would invite Mario Bonaca to take us through the
21	first item, which is the license renewal application
22	for Joseph M. Farley.
23	MEMBER BONACA: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
24	2) FINAL REVIEW OF THE LICENSE RENEWAL
25	APPLICATION

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1	FOR JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS
2	1 AND 2
3	2.1) REMARKS BY THE COGNIZANT SUBCOMMITTEE
4	CHAIRMAN
5	MEMBER BONACA: We are here to perform the
6	final review of the Farley nuclear plant license
7	renewal. We met, the subcommittee, on November 3rd,
8	2004 to review the interim SER. I point out that the
9	SER at that time already came without any open items.
10	This application is the first to use newly
11	revised NEI format as well as the first pilot license
12	renewal review to be reviewed by the NRC through the
13	approach of consistency with GALL audits or exceptions
14	to those.
15	With that, I'll turn to Dr. Kuo.
16	DR. KUO: Thank you. Good morning, Dr.
17	Bonaca.
18	2.2) BRIEFING BY AND DISCUSSIONS WITH
19	REPRESENTATIVES OF THE SOUTHERN NUCLEAR
20	OPERATING
21	COMPANY AND THE NRC STAFF
22	DR. KUO: My name is P. T. Kuo, the
23	program director for the license renewal and at the
24	moment the impacts program. To my right is Mr. Frank
25	Gillespie. He's the Deputy Director for the Division

of Regulatory Program Improvements. And to my far right is Tilda Liu, who is the project manager for this review. She's going to lead the presentation this morning.

Mr. Gillespie would like to make a few remarks before we go to the presentation. And the staff presentation will follow the applicant's presentation later.

MR. GILLESPIE: Yes. Thank you.

I would like to first thank Farley in a very public forum for being our first guinea pig.

They came to a meeting about a month before they were going to submit their application. And I said, "We've designated Farley a pilot plant."

And I looked across the table, and there was this look of shock on the Farley team's faces.

And they said, "Okay." They got caught betwixt and between. As Mario said, they are the first where we tried this audit process.

And compliments to Farley and Southern

Company. They had to do some catchup because past

precedent was becoming very important to us for two

things. The staff didn't want to keep making the same

decision over and over as if it was starting from a

clean piece of paper. And the other thing was we

wanted to be consistent in our decisions.

Farley was a big step in that. They were the first plant that showed us what we could do with GALL if I could say it that way. The new GALL was published as a draft at the end of January. And if you thumb through it, you'll see that the scope of the new GALL has doubled.

When we looked back at how many times now that we'll go 50 percent through the industry, we have made the same decision. We realize we were making the same decision over and over again with similar programs.

So Farley was the first step in coming up with a more standardized approach, basically an agreement on what acceptable aging management programs are in a much wider scope.

I think you're going to see some more internal changes. They are also a plant which demonstrated -- I know the staff is going to hit me when I say this -- the potential for coming up with scheduling ACRS meetings at 20 months, rather than 22 months, where industry is cooperating with us and we end up with draft SEs with no open items.

What we found was we were sending our schedules to ACRS. And then we would finish early.

1 And then, through no fault of anyone else, 2 scheduled it fine. But we were sitting on the 3 application for like two or three months kind of 4 waiting for an ACRS meeting. And so the solution to that was for us to 5 change the schedule long term we're giving you. 6 7 CHAIRMAN WALLIS: This is unusual behavior 8 by the staff. 9 MR. GILLESPIE: Yes. And so I think 10 Farley also demonstrated that working in a very timely way on things like RAIs in the process of developing 11 12 the draft SE, there should be a payoff. And so we're going to be talking to the industry. And this came up 13 14 in a management meeting with them about the idea of a 15 carrot and a stick. The carrot is schedule the ACRS meeting as 16 17 it were going to be 20 months away. And if everyone doesn't cooperate and play nice, then we add 18 19 two months later. And so we're going to be talking to 20 industry about doing that. And that way we're not 21 trying to perturbate anyone's long-term schedule at 22 the last minute. 23 So, again, thank you to Farley. 24 extra work. It cost the utility extra money to

demonstrate this to us. And it was the first step in

four plants.

I'll come up to Millstone, which is the other one that we went to submit on. Millstone, really, was almost like the fourth pilot. And Dominion stepped up and just did it also, so good interface there.

I do feel that at this point I do have to make a comment. You know we put out a letter on Beaver Valley. I'm sure you've seen the press clippings on the quality of the application. And there was a letter we received after some give and take from Nine Mile.

I would like to emphasize that those are plant-specific issues. We do not see that as an incrimination of the entire industry. There were specific quality issues with those applications. And what I don't want to do is let that issue kind of linger. So I thought it was kind of important to mention that.

We are doing acceptance review right now for Monticello and Palisades. And the staff will be done probably in two or three more weeks. Our acceptance review is now several engineers from the audit team actually looking at the application to see is this sufficient for us to actually go out and do an

1 efficient audit and have the rules been followed, is the list of systems adequate. We're not going to 2 argue over A-2 issues of safety systems anymore. 3 4 We find ourselves as writing a standard 5 set of RAIs every single time. And so we're getting past that and standardizing the whole thing a little 6 7 bit more. So that's kind of what is going on. 8 9 want to emphasize we have two plant-specific issues with two specific plants. And that should not be 10 painted with a broad brush. We're going to review 11 12 each one individually. Anyway, with that, so thank you. 13 14 appreciate the opportunity to say thank you again to 15 Farley in a public forum. And I appreciate the ACRS' indulgence as we have probably changed the schedule, 16 17 but now we'll give you enough notice so we're not trying to do it at the last minute. And so that is 18 19 kind of where we are going with it. 20 CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Thank you. 21 DR. KUO: And I will call on the applicant 22 to make the presentation. 23 MR. PIERCE: Thank you. 24 My name is Charles Pierce. I've been the 25 manager for the Farley license renewal program.

1 morning, Dr. Wallis and fellow ACRS members. 2 First of all, I want to thank Frank 3 Gillespie for his kind remarks. It was a shock to us 4 when we were first told that we were the first pilot, 5 but, again, we did strive to work very hard to address the NRC issues. And I think that we worked very well 6 7 together. We are pleased to be here today to discuss 8 our results of the license renewal process with you. 9 10 have brought our technical team, much of technical team with me, our technical experts. 11 12 Mike MacFarlane, who was to my right and is now up front, is basically my technical license 13 14 renewal manager. And he has been with us for the 15 entire Farley process. He will be making the presentation this morning to you for Southern Nuclear. 16 So I will just keep it brief and close 17 with that and let us move ahead with the discussions. 18 19 MR. MacFARLANE: I would like to thank 20 you, thank the Committee for letting us come here and 21 present a little bit about the Farley application. 22 The layout of our presentation based on some feedback 23 we got from the staff on what the ACRS would like to 24 see.

Essentially what we start with is just a

1 real brief description of the plant and some of the 2 features just to bring those members that were not in 3 the subcommittee and also in the audience up to speed. 4 The operating experience, significant 5 operating experience, for Farley over the years, current performance, we're going to look at some of 6 7 our major plant improvements that we have done at Farley. Then we're going to get into the general 8 9 description of the application and GALL exceptions and 10 then talk about corrective action program and how we handle commitments for the Farley license renewal 11 application. 12 So, with that, I'll go ahead and get 13 14 started. Just briefly a description of Farley. 15 located near Ashford, Alabama, which is actually The largest town near there 16 southeastern Alabama. would be Dothan, Alabama if anybody is familiar with 17 18 that area. 19 It's a three-loop Westinghouse PWR. 20 architect-engineer was combined with Bechtel Southern Company Services, which is part of Southern 21 22 The current power rating for Farley is 27 Company. 23 and 75 megawatts thermal. And our mission operating license for Unit 1 was 1977 and for Unit 2 was 1981. 24 25 I put this in here to kind of give you a

little bit of a view of what the plant looks like. The site is so large we can't get all of the features in here, but this gets the majority of the features in here.

Of interest usually is how we accomplish our cooling, particularly for the safety-related stuff. The source of cooling water for the safety systems is our cooling water pond, which is a seismic pond. And it is the ultimate heat sink.

The makeup to that pond would be our river water system, which pulls out of the Chattahoochee River. And what we do for service water is a once-through system. In other words, we pull out of that pond and we return either to the pond or to the river depending on. In safety mode, it will return back to the pond. In normal mode, it returns back to the river.

And for the circ water system, which is for cooling the condenser in the turbine cycle, we use the cooling tower system. And it gets its makeup also off the surface water system.

Farley has six off-site power sources.

Two of them are 500-kV sources. And then we also have

-- what was the other one? Two hundred and thirty kV

is the other four.

1	Of interest to the Committee last time was
2	our PRA results. It doesn't really fit in the slides
3	very well, but this seemed to be the best place since,
4	really, it's based on plant features and those kinds
5	of things. The CDF for Farley is 3.35 times 10-5 is
б	the current PRA result.
7	Significant operating experience for
8	Farley, in looking at
9	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Excuse me. What was
10	the dominant contributor? Do you remember?
11	MR. MacFARLANE: It's loss of an
12	on-service surface water train, basically loss of your
13	critical cooling. It impacts a closed cooling water
14	system and then impacts things like charging pump
15	sealant, sealant cooling, and those kinds of things.
16	MEMBER ROSEN: The number was 3.35 you
17	say?
18	MR. MacFARLANE: 3.35 times 10-5.
19	MEMBER BONACA: Do you remember the
20	external events?
21	MR. MacFARLANE: Pardon?
22	MEMBER BONACA: Does it include external
23	events?
24	MR. MacFARLANE: This is for the internal
25	events. The external events is a separate evaluation.

1	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Do you remember what
2	the LOCA contributions were?
3	MR. MacFARLANE: I actually have it back
4	in my notebook.
5	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: That's okay. LOCA is
6	due to the break of a pipe.
7	MR. MacFARLANE: LOCA contributors is
8	the percentage of total CDF is just below six percent.
9	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Six percent.
10	MR. MacFARLANE: But it's 1.97 times 10-6.
11	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Okay. Thank you.
12	MEMBER ROSEN: We're going to keep going.
13	Fire and shutdown risk.
14	MR. MacFARLANE: I already closed the
15	page. Hold on a second. I don't have it broken out,
16	let's see, in that manner. I have it by initiating
17	event categories. Fire is probably under the special
18	initiators. I don't have that value.
19	I do know we do have some unit differences
20	that caused some issues. One of them is like the fire
21	water header, and it's a flooding event. But I don't
22	have the numbers for the fire event PRA.
23	MEMBER ROSEN: Are they available
24	someplace?
25	MR. MacFARLANE: I'm sure we can get them.

1	MEMBER ROSEN: Do you have a feel for
2	percentage-wise the total that fire represents?
3	MR. MacFARLANE: Fire?
4	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: I don't think you
5	should close that page.
6	MR. MacFARLANE: Yes. I keep trying to
7	get off of this.
8	MEMBER ROSEN: I mean, is it a large
9	contributor or a small contributor, the total CDF?
10	MR. MacFARLANE: I think it's in the low
11	to medium category in terms of how that would work.
12	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: So fire is an
13	internal event? It's included in the 3.3, 10-5?
14	MR. MacFARLANE: I'm no PRA expert. All
15	I know is they generally model the fire events very
16	conservatively. And so you do
17	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: I know, but
18	MR. MacFARLANE: You do get higher values
19	in fire events
20	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Right.
21	MR. MacFARLANE: just because of how it
22	is modeled.
23	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Yes. I know that,
24	but you gave us a number for CDF.
25	MR. MacFARLANE: Right.

1	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: And you said that was
2	internal events only.
3	MR. MacFARLANE: Right. And it's included
4	in there.
5	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: It's included in
6	that?
7	MR. MacFARLANE: That's correct.
8	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: So you have not done
9	a seismic analysis or you have done it but separate?
10	MR. MacFARLANE: Correct. The external
11	events is a separate evaluation.
12	MEMBER BONACA: Yes, I know that, but, I
13	mean, does this plant also have an external events
14	PRA?
15	MR. MacFARLANE: Yes. The one that we
16	have maintained generally is the internal events, but
17	there is an external events that is out there as part
18	of the IPEEE.
19	MEMBER BONACA: All right.
20	MR. MacFARLANE: Getting on to the
21	operating experience, the
22	MEMBER POWERS: Well, I guess I'm really
23	confused because the IEEE typically includes both fire
24	and seismic. I mean, fire is not usually considered
25	an internal initiator.

1	MEMBER ROSEN: For some strange reason.
2	MEMBER POWERS: It's not really a strange
3	reason. It's just the way that it happened to be done
4	historically.
5	MR. MacFARLANE: You may be correct for
6	Farley. I'm not the PRA expert.
7	MR. PIERCE: Yes. Mike is not a PRA
8	expert. And we have not brought along our PRA expert.
9	MEMBER POWERS: I don't think you have to
10	be an expert. I mean, in today's environment,
11	everybody ought to understand what the general
12	categories of this are.
13	MR. MacFARLANE: Now you're talking about
14	which evaluation it's in.
15	MR. PALLA: Excuse me if I might. I'm Bob
16	Palla with the NRC PRA staff.
17	Not as part of the safety side review but
18	as part of the environment review, we looked at severe
19	accident mitigation alternatives. And we do use the
20	PRA there to help guide the identification evaluation
21	of potential plant improvement. As part of that
22	review, we didn't review the PRA, but we looked at the
23	PRA and the information contained thereon.
24	The information from IEEE on fires
25	indicates a frequency of 5 times 10-5 fire events.

1	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: So it was not part of
2	the
3	MR. PALLA: No. And it normally not be.
4	It's separate.
5	MEMBER ROSEN: And it is essentially
6	equivalent to the internal events initiated.
7	MEMBER SIEBER: I don't know that it's
8	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Bob, what was the
9	seismic? Do you remember?
10	MR. PALLA: I don't. I am looking in our
11	evaluation that we prepared. I don't see a number
12	there. So probably a margins approach was used in a
13	
14	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: So the total, then,
15	probably is around 10-4.
16	MEMBER POWERS: It sounds to me like the
17	total is a little over 10-4 .
18	MR. PALLA: Probably is. Well, from what
19	we learn and from the feedback we get from analysts
20	that develop these fire event frequencies, there's a
21	lot more conservatism in the numbers. They're more
22	screening values than they are what you might
23	associate with level 1 PRA internal events are more
24	close to the mark. I think you tend to see a lot more
25	screening-type numbers in the fire assessment.

1	So a direct comparison of internal events,
2	core damage frequencies, and fire screening values,
3	you have to be careful if you compare them.
4	MEMBER POWERS: How much do you want to
5	bet that for every conservatism you can find in the
6	fire analysis, I can find a non-conservatism?
7	MR. PALLA: Well, you probably could on a
8	one-to-one basis, but our understanding is that you
9	could probably argue that the numbers that you
10	generate could be reduced. As you move more towards
11	a fire PRA, I think you would tend to see the numbers
12	from the screening analysis be reduced.
13	MEMBER ROSEN: I don't think that you can
14	make a generalization that's valid. I think what you
15	will see is that some plants will, in fact, be
16	reduced, but there will be outliers at plants that
17	turn out to be higher. And you'll see a more relevant
18	picture.
19	MEMBER POWERS: Okay. So the \$64 question
20	is, which one is Farley?
21	MEMBER ROSEN: I think the applicant
22	should answer that.
23	MEMBER POWERS: I mean, it seems to me
24	that fire is a significant issue here.
25	MEMBER ROSEN: Absolutely. I think it is

1 a significant issue in almost every plant. 2 MacFARLANE: I don't think I can answer all on fire. I do know we are using a 3 4 risk-based approach right now in terms of eliminating 5 some raceway fire wrap that we have, particularly in our surface water intake structure. And that process 6 7 is ongoing. So there is some specific fire modeling 8 going on and using a risk-based approach. 9 MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: So you are doing this as a result of the fire risk assessment or as --10 MR. MacFARLANE: It is a result of cable 11 Farley had an exemption for cable. 12 elimination. we have committed to eliminate reliance on that for 13 14 our Appendix R basis. And in that particular area, 15 that happens to be a large open structure. And that's 16 one of the approaches. They're using that and some 17 other things. For that particular area, there will be a 18 19 very detailed modeling of fire scenarios and looking 20 at ultimate risk, but that's ongoing right now. 21 don't have results or anything like that for that. 22 There is a place where we are using risk-based 23 approach. 24 MEMBER ROSEN: I think, suffice it to say, 25 though Farley has only done what that even

1	characterized as a screening, the number is
2	substantial. It's even higher than the internal
3	events number. And it bears attention.
4	MR. MacFARLANE: Okay.
5	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: I guess the question
6	in my mind is, how is that relevant to license renewal
7	approvals? Is there any message in this result that
8	one should take and consider in the context of license
9	renewal?
10	I know that if you go formal, the PRA is
11	not part of the renewal. It's not part of the rule.
12	But in terms of a technical approach, I mean, is there
13	anything there that I should worry about?
14	MEMBER BONACA: Well, I mean, if it is a
15	concern, it should be a concern under the core license
16	basis.
17	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: See, that's my point,
18	that it
19	MEMBER BONACA: Okay. So now I'm saying
20	that the fire issue is a very important issue. Maybe
21	it could be pursued further for all plants. But there
22	is a specific requirement at this stage to do anything
23	to address whatever number comes up.
24	So we are left here with a question, to
25	the extent 5 times 10-5 is a conservative assessment,
I	I

1	a non-conservative assessment, we're making a debate
2	on that. And I don't think we will ever know until
3	somebody does more work on it. But the
4	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: I, frankly, don't
5	think it's conservative. I'm with Dana on that. I
6	think there are many places where
7	MEMBER BONACA: Because we have seen many
8	other plants that
9	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Arbitrary assumptions
10	that
11	MEMBER BONACA: That is a number that
12	seems to be pretty consistent for other plants that
13	DR. DENNING: Let's look back at
14	historically at IPEEE and what kind of requirements we
15	placed. They weren't very stringent as far as the
16	quality of the fire PRA. And it was good enough at
17	that point. The question is, are we suggesting we
18	reopen that issue from a probablistic viewpoint or the
19	deterministic requirements on fire, which are pretty
20	stringent, are they adequate to make us feel that we
21	can move forward?
22	MEMBER ROSEN: As an agency, there hasn't
23	been a reopening of this issue, but there are new
24	tools available. And this fire risk requantification
25	effort between Research and EPRI is coming to

1	fruition.
2	Having looked at the document somewhat,
3	although I have more work to do, I think it is an
4	improvement. If plants were to follow the new
5	guidance in the risk requantification work, they would
6	have better PRAs, fire PRAs.
7	MEMBER KRESS: I'm having trouble, like
8	George, figuring out what this has to do with license
9	extension. Since we seem to be bound by a certain set
10	of rules and ways to go about it, it does not include
11	any considerations of CDF as I can see.
12	Not only that, this is a large dry
13	containment in a low-population area. So the LERF
14	probably is pretty low. I don't know what it is. I
15	suppose he may tell us, but
16	MEMBER BONACA: As I pointed out, I mean,
17	if it is an issue, it is an issue under the current
18	licensing basis. And I don't know
19	MEMBER KRESS: Yes. It's
20	MEMBER BONACA: why the fire issue is
21	open now, but certainly it's not pertinent to the
22	license renewal.
23	MEMBER KRESS: That was my feeling.
24	MEMBER ROSEN: I think it's like a lot of
25	things we discuss here. They may not be directly

1	relevant to license renewal. They are just ACRS is
2	interested in a particular technical subject.
3	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Absolutely, but it
4	matters in terms of what we are going to address in
5	our review ultimately.
6	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: And if we go on talking
7	about it too long, we won't finish this presentation.
8	(Laughter.)
9	MEMBER POWERS: Spoken like a good
10	chairman.
11	MEMBER KRESS: But we have all day
12	Saturday.
13	MR. MacFARLANE: I would like not to be
14	here Saturday if I could.
15	MEMBER BONACA: With that, let's proceed.
16	MR. MacFARLANE: Operating experience for
17	Farley. In 1983, we had an issue with a fuel cladding
18	failure on Unit 1. The cause of that intended to be
19	a baffle jetting issue. It has to do with the flow in
20	the reactor vessel getting through the baffle plates
21	and causing a jetting action on the fuel.
22	The correction for that was we changed
23	that unit to an upflow design, which eliminates that
24	flow path and also reduces loading on the baffle
25	bolts.
Į.	I and the second

1 In 1985, on Unit 2, in preparation for an 2 inspection, they noticed some failed tendon anchor The root cause evaluation of that ended up 3 4 determining that it was caused by some 5 hydrogen-induced stress cracking. There inspection effort, 6 was а biq 7 replacement of all of those tendons, those tendon anchor heads, and then the same thing, inspection in 8 the other unit and inspection of all of these. 9 were on a particular set of tendons. 10 11 And then there were follow-up inspections 12 in two successive intervals with no other failures And we haven't had any since. So it seems to 13 14 somehow related to initial construction and 15 manifested itself early in the life. So you didn't change 16 MEMBER SHACK: materials or lubricants or --17 MR. MacFARLANE: They did come up with a 18 19 new greasing process in terms of how they put these 20 heads in, making sure they're greased on the back side 21 and front side and the cans were full. But the anchor 22 heads themselves, the material didn't change 23 anything like that. In 1987, you're probably familiar with 24

this bulletin. Farley in coming up out of an outage

1 had a crack on a safety injection line into the RCS. 2 This is kind of the initiator for the 8808 bulletin. 3 It was caused by some valve leakage and then basically 4 some thermal cycling that was going on at that 5 interface with the main RCS loop caused by turbulent 6 penetration. 7 Of course, the valve leakage was fixed. The monitoring was put in place. And there's been a 8 9 lot of work in the industry in terms of identifying 10 types of configurations that can lead to these types of problems and instrumentation. And this is actually 11 12 factored into our fatigue-monitoring program. continue to monitor this. We haven't had any problems 13 14 since then, but it's still part of the program. 15 FNP performance. For 2004, all our 16 performance indicators are green. They've been green 17 for many years at Farley. Farley has been historically a very good performer. In 2004, we did 18 19 have our highest net plant capacity for a two-outage 20 year. And we also had the shortest refueling outage 21 for Unit 2, which for us was significant. 22 These highest and CHAIRMAN WALLIS: 23 shortest are compared with the entire industry or just 24 with your own history?

No.

MacFARLANE:

MR.

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With our own

1 history, like our shortest outage is not shortest by 2 industry by any stretch. Later on we'll talk about 3 improvements. A lot of this is reflective of our 4 steam generator replacement has allowed us to go a 5 little bit shorter because we don't have anywhere near the work in the generators that we used to. 6 7 Out of significance that we think significant, is our radiation dose levels for outage 8 9 work and just overall plant operation are extremely We tied the U.S. record for lowest radiation 10 dose for a refueling outage. And we attribute this to 11 12 our zinc addition project that we had. We put it in Unit 2 first. And we've also 13 14 put it in Unit 1. And what we're seeing is much 15 better performance in terms of crud burst that we do in going into an outage and keeping doses down. 16 MEMBER ROSEN: How short was the shortest 17 Farley outage? 18 19 MR. MacFARLANE: It was 33.7. In terms of 20 major improvements, one of our most significant major 21 improvements was our steam generator replacement. 22 replaced the entire generators. They're a 23 Westinghouse model 54F design. So it's the latest 24 generation design, has the Alloy 690 thermally treated

tubing and stainless steel support plates.

1 Another major improvement we're doing in 2 response to some of the issues we have on Alloy 600 is 3 we are replacing our reactor vessel heads. We've 4 already replaced the Unit 1 head. We did that in Fall 5 of 2004. And, once again, we had the second lowest dose for a head replacement in the U.S. 6 7 CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Looks like a gold-plated 8 head to me. 9 MR. MacFARLANE: It's just shiny. The 10 cost of it, maybe it could be. I don't know. The Unit 2 head replacement is scheduled 11 for the fall of this year. And just a note that we 12 use Alloy 690 in that head. 13 14 Another big item, although this is not in 15 the scope of the license renewal but it is a major ticket item, high expense, and shows the commitment to 16 the long-term operation of the plant, is a cooling 17 18 tower replacement project. 19 The original cooling towers for Farley 20 were a wooden structure design, the old redwood, 21 Douglas fir towers. And we have replaced all of those 22 towers on the site for both units. It's somewhat of a unique project in that 23 24 we have some space limitations within the site in

terms of trying to site these towers. And we came up

with a unique way to do this cycling towers on and off as we built them out. And, as a result, it was awarded an NEI top industry practice award for the innovative way we did that.

This is a big bonus to the plant and frees up a lot of maintenance craft work for other activities because the old towers were really a drain on the maintenance staff. You're familiar with that, I guess.

(Laughter.)

MR. MacFARLANE: There were a couple of other improvements I wanted to just briefly mention. They are not as significant as those, but we talked about the zinc addition project. Of interest, we did replace the baffle formal bolts in the units. There's a partial replacement of the number of bolts that are required to meet the design requirements.

We also are doing a dry cask installation.

And we already talked about the zinc addition, which,
you know, one of its benefits is to reduce the
potential for primary water stress corrosion cracking.

It's one of the reasons it was put in.

Brief overview of the application. You know, we submitted it in September of 2003. We discussed there was a format change that was put

together for this current class of applications. It's affectionately called the Class of '03 format. We were the first to use that.

In our process -- and that format drives this as well -- we emphasized the use of GALL and previously approved approaches. We didn't call it past precedence. That came about a little bit later, after us. That was this late-breaking process change. But we did use past precedence, so to speak, in terms of how we did our strategies. And we were the first to use this new NRC review process.

The Committee has expressed interest in GALL exceptions. Mainly our GALL exceptions would fall into these three categories. We had several that are related to using different or later versions of codes and standards.

Expansion of a program scope beyond that described in GALL occurs in a couple of places or use of some later NRC guidance or precedence. Part of that is the ISG process. Part of it is using alternatives that have been approved by the staff.

Some specific GALL exceptions of note: reactor vessel surveillance program. We came in.

We're a high lead plant. And we have already pulled our 60-year capsules. And we had an exception to

allow us to leave our last capsules in place until 80 years equivalent, effective full-power years, and pull those things out at that point. They will be pulled out in 2007. They will have gotten to that point.

Reactor vessel internals program. This is an item that really reflects the latest staff.

an item that really reflects the latest staff thinking. There are a lot of issues going on there. And we agreed that we would submit our inspection plan for review and approval at least two years prior to the period of extended operation to give the staff time to look through that and be in agreement with our final version.

We're a participant in the MRP and for the reactor vessel internals program. Non-EQ cables is an example where really there is an approved ISG out there of an alternative program, and that's what we use. So that is an exception, but it is a previously approved exception.

The Southern Nuclear Corrective Action

Program is a common process across our fleet. Our

fleet would be the Hatch site, the Vogtle site, the

Farley site, and corporate. And it uses one set of

procedures that addresses all of that. It's common to

all of those locations.

Everything starts out as a condition

report. Under the corrective action program, condition report is going to look at, assess the impact, the immediate impact, on the unit. It's going to look at severity levels and types of is root cause required and those kinds of items.

And then what will happen, it dispositions the CR. And one of the items that can be dispositioned is the action items. And so the system includes a process for identifying action items and owners of those action items and schedules and tracking those things to completion. And it also is the repository for the documentation of all of this resolution.

It's integrated into our work control system. We have initiated a project that's been implemented in all of those sites called a SNC Power. It's a common database system that we do our work order systems, our CRs, our action items, all of that. Our documents are stored in there. And so that one system integrates all of those four sites.

On top of that, there is a weekly status report that is sent out to all the supervision to keep status on all of this, make sure that people are aware and keeping it in front of them of what their due dates are and that they're working these items off.

And there are rules in terms of if you're late and those kinds of things. It keeps those things up and makes sure that nothing falls through the cracks.

That kind of leads us in to commitment tracking because we do use that system in terms of how we're going to implement commitments for Farley. The commitments start with several sources, but ultimately they're going to end up in a safety evaluation report, the LRA and RAI responses. And we also provided what's called a future actions list, which shows up in the safety evaluation report. Identify those future actions that we have to perform.

Those items are loaded in to the commitment-tracking system. That commitment-tracking system is an independent system that also attracts these things. Completion is done at the commitment level.

For license renewal, the license renewal project has built license renewal implementation packages. Those packages include what the commitments are, how they're being translated into implementing procedures. It has the drafts of those implementing procedures. It has a cross-reference list for the commitment numbers and the future action list numbers and those kinds of things.

1 We use those to package the work by how it's going to be implemented. In other words, you may 2 3 have three commitments only implemented by one person. 4 It's one program. And so it's a kind of packaging 5 tool. We used that. What we did is we created 6 7 condition report to address license renewal implementation and assigned action items out of that 8 9 for these implementation packages. 10 So every commitment have, implementation package now resides out in the action 11 12 item with an assigned person and assigned dates. Those implementation packages right now 13 just waiting, really, on the issuance of a 14 15 license. We have them all prepared. And once we get the license, we will do a final review to make sure we 16 have these latest versions of the procedures in there. 17 And we will issue those out to the cognizant personnel 18 19 at site and corporate that own these programs to 20 perform these procedure changes and get them 21 implemented. 22 I know the Committee has been interested 23 in what our plan is in terms of how soon we're going 24 to implement commitments. And our plan is to do that

immediately after we issue the license. We'll issue

these packages out. And then there is a short time window that is given for the plant and corporate personnel to turn those procedures around into the system.

The only items that won't fall under that, there are some items, commitments, that are time-based, like one-time inspection. The program document will be done in the short time frame. However, the actual inspections are not permitted five years prior to the period of extended operations. So there are some commitments that do have later time limits in them, but they're part of the commitment.

This is just an example of a page out of one of these implementation packages. It kind of gives you the front-end matter before you get to one of the procedures. But it gives you the commitment.

This happened to be a late-breaking commitment that we made. It talks about where the source was, identifies this AI number you see in the right column as the action item. That tells you the action item number that actually is tracking this item. And then underneath that, it is telling you where in the procedure we are putting that. And then within this package, you would find that mark-up for that procedure.

1 MEMBER BONACA: This is a change, right? 2 I mean, the --3 MR. MacFARLANE: Correct. 4 MEMBER BONACA: Yes. Okay. 5 MR. MacFARLANE: With that, we would just like to close in saying that, you know, we think that 6 7 the inspection bore out that it was quality 8 application. You know, we emphasized the use of GALL 9 in positions previously accepted by the staff. think that's why it went pretty smoothly and that the 10 11 NRC review is very thorough. 12 The consistent with GALL process really allows a lot of interaction with the staff. 13 14 think both sides really benefitted from that. 15 That's all I had. Okay. I have one further question 16 MEMBER ROSEN: on the commitment. Let me see if I understand what 17 you're saying. What you said is that by, say, six 18 19 months or a year from now, you could send a team out 20 to look at your commitment implementation and find 21 that, despite the fact that you're not going to enter 22 the period of extended operation until 2017 for Unit 23 1, many of the commitments have already been 24 implemented. Is that correct? And that would be

continuing through the period until 2017?

MR. MacFARLANE: Well, most of the commitments in like the future action list are minor improvements. And those are going to be in process. And they will be at some stage of completion. They should be.

Six months may be a little too soon, but within that year, we would expect them to have processes, procedure changes. A lot of what we are doing has to do with things we are already doing that now have become ingrained in the license renewal commitment. So it's going into existing activities and noting that those now are commitments as well.

So there's a lot of that in terms of this process of marking something that we're currently doing that this is now a commitment. It's a way to prevent them from changing it without being aware of what they are doing.

MEMBER ROSEN: Yes. I am not so concerned about those things that are just being marked.

They're already being done. They're just being marked as licensing renewal commitments. I'm really talking about -- and I'm not worried about the one-time inspections. I'm just worried about the class of things that are new to the procedure that are new to Farley and that that implementation begin soon.

1 MR. MacFARLANE: That's correct. Some of 2 activities, like I said, do have some They're analysis-type items if you 3 constraints on it. 4 actually look through the future action commitment 5 But not that many of them are really program-related that they're minor enhancements and 6 7 those kinds of things or scope. An example would be testing a sprinkler 8 9 head for fire protection at year 50. Well, we'll put that in, but we won't actually do the testing until 10 11 off in the future. 12 But yes, we will be processing the changes and putting, like in those cases, we'll put a task out 13 14 there in the maintenance system that would trigger off 15 And we will put those in place. the date. DR. DENNING: Could I ask a question about 16 17 instrumentation and control system? What do you expect to happen over the time period of future plant 18 19 operations as far as upgrading of that? Do you have 20 any major modifications that have occurred or are 21 expected to occur? 22 I'm not really the right MR. MacFARLANE: 23 one to answer that. The things that I'm aware of, I 24 know we have done a lot of module changes in how the

7300 system cards are put together. I believe there

1 have been significant changes there, but the base unit 2 is the same. 3 We have done digital controls. Digital 4 electrohydraulic controls for the turbine are already 5 in place. DR. DENNING: I'm just curious. 6 Will that 7 just evolve over the time period? I mean, one worries 8 about obsolescence and the availability of replacement 9 cards and stuff like that. Is there a plan for that 10 or does it just evolve? MR. MEYER: Chalmor Meyer with Southern 11 12 Nuclear. Because we have got three sites, we have 13 14 got initiatives going on for all three sites that want studying obsolescence and particularly looking at 15 16 instrumentation systems, whether we would go 17 digital or other things. So those are ongoing studies, and it is an 18 19 active process for all three sites. I don't know of 20 any decisions at this point, but that is the mind set 21 for all three. 22 What he is describing, we MR. MacFARLANE: 23 have what's called a long-term planning process and 24 reliability improvement program. Also, just thinking 25 about after you asked the question, the plant computer

1 is one area that we're replacing. So we are hitting 2 these types of things. 3 I just can't answer to you what all the 4 actual plans are, but there is a process in place to 5 keep our eyes on that and get them out into the planning process and on to budgeting and scheduling to 6 7 get those things implemented. MEMBER RANSOM: Out of curiosity, is the 8 9 SNC Power database system one that will improve safety 10 culture or contribute to safety culture, I guess, through looking for common indicators of problems, 11 12 like Davis-Bessee, for example, where there were a lot of things that should have been caught, you know, 13 14 early on and were put together basically to come to a 15 conclusion that something detrimental was really going 16 on. It does have that process 17 MR. MacFARLANE: built into it. I want to say the SNC Power system 18 19 itself is the reason for that, but there are a bending 20 of issues to be able to evaluate them from a common 21 thread standpoint to look at, are you having a trend 22 or is there a common thread through a couple of 23 different items that indicate, say, a process or 24 programmatic type problem?

One thing it has done is that the way the

1	system was changed is CRs are used for lots of
2	different things to where it is not a big deal to
3	write a CR. So from a safety culture standpoint, I
4	think that is an improvement that there is no issue
5	with writing one. So everybody knows that we do it
6	all the time. And so that really makes you feel good
7	about things are going to get identified.
8	MEMBER BONACA: Okay. Thank you.
9	If there are no further questions, Mr.
10	Kuo?
11	DR. KUO: While Tilda is getting ready, I
12	would like to say a few words about Tilda. Tilda is
13	a senior project manager in our group, but she is now
14	moving up to bigger, better things. She has been
15	selected for the office TA effective April 18th. So
16	this may be the last major action she is doing for our
17	group.
18	I would like to thank her for her effort
19	she put in for this project and the time she spent on
20	nights and weekends into this project. I wish her
21	every success in her future endeavor.
22	Thank you very much.
23	MS. LIU: Thank you, P. T.
24	MEMBER BONACA: Thank you.
25	MS. LIU: Good morning, Dr. Wallis and

very distinguished members of the full Committee. Му name is Tilda Liu. And I am the Farley license It is my pleasure to come renewal application TM. back since the last meeting to brief you on the staff's status on the SER. With me is Ms. Kimberly Corp. Most of you know her already. She has been helping with Farley while I was on rotation the last few months. Kimberly will be assisting me with the presentation this morning. To give an overview, the draft SER was issued back in October 15, 2004. As you will recall, there were no open or confirmatory items. issued on March 3rd. And staff concluded at that time that there were no issues and that the Farley application has met the requirements of 10 CFR Part 54. Going on to the highlights of the review, as the applicant mentioned and as you all know, this was the first application to use a newly revised NEI It's also the first pilot review to implement

the consistency with GALL audit in terms of AMPs and AMRs.

The staff achieved significant efficiency with the implementation of this new process. This is

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evidenced by reduction in the number of RAIs and that the audits provided direct interaction with the applicant, which resulted in a minimal number of correspondence.

Continuing on on highlights of the review, we have three license conditions. The first is that there ought to be FSAR updates on the issuance of the renewed license and that the commitments contained in Appendix A to the SER should be completed in accordance with the schedule.

The third license condition is related to the reactor vessel surveillance program, that the applicant needs to continue reading the STM standards and that any changes to the capsule withdrawal schedule or the storage requirements must be approved by the NRC staff.

There were additional components brought into scope as a result of the applicant's revised methodology under 10 CFR 54.4(a)(2). There were eight subsystems of auxiliary systems that were brought into scope.

We had one aging management program added after the applicant's submittal of the application.

This was a class-specific A&P. It's the periodic surveillance and preventive maintenance activities

program.

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Moving on to section 2, I want to point out that during the review process, the applicant revised its original methodology to the criteria pursuant to to 10 CFR 54.4(a)(2).

Initially the mechanical scoping criteria for spray interaction for low-energy lines assumed a spray interaction of 20 feet radius and limited the valid targets to only electrical SSCs. The applicant revised its criteria by using a spaces approach, eliminating the 20 feet criterion and expended valid targets to include mechanical and structural SSCs, in addition to the electrical SSCs.

We had а third optional inspection conducted on Farley. This was conducted from March 9th through 10. We have concluded this was a regional conducted inspection, and it was to evaluate applicant's commitment-tracking system.

As documented in the inspection report, which I hope some of you had a chance to take a look at, this was issued on March 21st. The inspection verified that all 20 commitments listed in Appendix A to the SER had the loadings to come into the applicant's commitment-tracking system and that the applicant's planned commitment-tracking system

1 contains many more detailed items for the aging 2 management program implementation than those listed in the SER. 3 4 We found that the inspection verified 5 clear traceability in the applicant's documentation and commitment-tracking system for the future action 6 7 items list. And we also noted that the implementation 8 guidance has been incorporated into license renewal 9 basis documents and the plan procedures are being 10 developed right now. MEMBER RANSOM: I have a question. 11 Does 12 procedure for tracking these the NRC have а commitments or an inspection basically to assure that 13 they have, indeed, been met? 14 15 Right. In Appendix A to the MS. LIU: SER, that's where we have all of the commitments. 16 17 the purpose of the inspection was to verify each single one of those are included into the applicant's 18 19 system. 20 MR. LEE: Yes. This is Sam Lee. T'm from 21 the license renewal program. 22 There is an inspection procedure, number 23 71-003, that actually contains the Appendix A table 24 from the safety evaluation report. This is for the 25 region to implement at year 40.

1	MEMBER RANSOM: Thank you.
2	MEMBER ROSEN: At year 40, Sam?
3	MR. LEE: Yes. After they completed the
4	commitment, the license condition would direct them to
5	notify us. And then the region would implement
6	71-003.
7	MEMBER ROSEN: Okay. So many of them will
8	be done before year 40?
9	MR. LEE: That's correct, yes. When they
10	compare, they will notify us.
11	MS. LIU: Okay. Moving on to section 3,
12	aging management review results, we had a total of 22
13	aging management programs, 9 of which are considered
14	common, 11 of which are considered component and
15	structural group-specific aging management programs.
16	Of these 22 aging managing programs, 8 of them are
17	existing programs, 5 enhanced, and 9 are new aging
18	management programs.
19	In terms of GALL consistency, eight of
20	which are consistent with GALL. With enhancements,
21	there were five. With exceptions, there were five.
22	And not consistent with GALL, there were four A&Ps.
23	For the buried piping and tank inspection
24	program, we wanted to mention this A&P because since
25	the issuance of the draft SER but prior to the

issuance of the final SER, the applicant revised this A&P by providing initiative information to this A&P as well as revising its commitments associated with it, as the applicant mentioned earlier today.

As you recall, this is a new A&P that would be consistent with GALL with exceptions. It included the provisions for our inspection of buried stainless steel and copper alloy piping.

The applicant provided additional information that for coded and unwrapped piping, visual inspection will be used to examine external services to confirm that there is no loss of material and that loss of material and piping will be reported and evaluated in accordance to site corrective action procedures.

As a result, the applicant took the initiative and revised commitment item number 9 that you will perform an inspection of buried piping would in ten years after entering the period of extended operation unless opportunistic inspection has occurred within this period and that prior to the tenth year, the applicant will perform and engineering evaluation to determine if sufficient inspection had been conducted to draw a conclusion regarding the ability of the underground coatings to protect the underground

1	pipings and things from degradation.
2	If not, the applicant will conduct a
3	focused inspection to allow that conclusion to be
4	reached.
5	MEMBER BONACA: That is a change that is
6	also generic to other plants, right? You have made
7	this change as a requirement in GALL?
8	MS. LIU: That is correct.
9	MEMBER BONACA: Okay. Because, I mean,
10	there was always a requirement for this program to be
11	periodic inspections. And, yet, everybody was using
12	opportunistic inspections. So just for clarification,
13	now there is a new requirement in general
14	DR. CHEN: That is correct.
15	MEMBER BONACA: that if you haven't
16	performed an opportunistic inspection by ten years,
17	you then go in. Another question I had was, is this
18	any inspection or is it going to be in more
19	susceptible locations? That was another criterion in
20	GALL.
21	MS. LIU: I would like to ask Dr. Ken Chen
22	to address that question further.
23	DR. KUO: In the new GALL, we are
24	attempting to specify locations, basically away from
25	the straight long piping, say, for instance, and going

1 to the band and elbows and all of that, where we see 2 most of the degradation will occur. What we're struggling with 3 MEMBER POWERS: 4 little bit is how you go about doing this 5 engineering evaluation. Suppose that we have, just for the sake of argument, 25 identified locations of 6 7 enhanced potential for degradation. How many do I have to inspect in order to 8 be able to draw a conclusion on whether there has been 9 10 sufficient inspection or not? DR. CHEN: This is Ken Chen. I'm license 11 renewal section B. And I'm also the auditing leader. 12 This item became surfaced after the SER 13 14 open item. That's what we reported here. 15 Although I haven't said a word yet regarding this, Mike MacFarlane has already done a lot of groundwork 16 17 for us. This is a program that, although in the 18 19 SER, is listed for exception. However, these are 20 exceptions categorized as, as Mike says, we ask the 21 program to do more than the GALL asked to do. 22 So in my opinion, it's not exceptions. 23 There is only one exception. That is one listed as a 24 commitment in --25 MEMBER POWERS: But you're not answering

1 my question. My question is, how do you do this 2 engineering evaluation? How you do this engineering 3 DR. CHEN: 4 evaluation is before the end of the tenth year, the 5 applicant has agreed to do an engineering evaluation based on how much opportunistic excavation has already 6 7 been done. Does that cover enough piping category, 8 material categories to satisfy? Now, these excavation activities will 9 ensure that the underground piping is well-protected 10 by the coating and the wrapping. Since it's an 11 12 engineering evaluation, we will have to see how do the results of the engineering evaluation come up? 13 14 there are insufficient locations being inspected by 15 opportunistic excavation, additional focusing inspection will be done. 16 17 MEMBER BONACA: But, you see, the question I have is that assume now -- the way I write it, you 18 19 start with the first year of the standard operation 20 and you go for nine years without any opportunistic 21 inspections. And then the requirement comes in that 22 says you will inspect at ten years. 23 Ι perform Now, so if an engineer 24 evaluation knowing nothing because I haven't gone in 25 that through the site, how do I make the conclusion?

1 How do Ι use the results of an opportunistic 2 inspection that I have not performed? 3 DR. CHEN: It's a good question, but I 4 don't think the applicant is intended to go that way. 5 Actually, there are several opportunistic inspections already performed. And based on the review of the 6 7 operating experience, it seems that the frequency of 8 the excavation or buried components under activities would be sufficient to justify most of the 9 10 coatings and wrappings effective. And there may be one or two areas it's not 11 12 going to be effective. Then that would belong to the category of performing focused excavation. 13 14 are not in that time zone yet. We cannot say with 15 that opportunistic excavation recovered, 90 percent or 95 percent of the high-risk locations. 16 matter of fact, this applicant 17 As pointed out to us that the GALL report, the new GALL, 18 19 did not explicitly say what should be inspected. 20 those would be incorporated through the commenting 21 period and will be put into the revised GALL. 22 So when the revised GALL comes out, there 23 will be the requirement of focused inspection if the 24 opportunistic inspection is not doing its job. 25 You're not helping me at MEMBER POWERS:

1	all.
2	DR. CHEN: Sorry. I think the answer is
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4	MEMBER POWERS: No. You're going to
5	listen to me first so we understand the question.
6	PARTICIPANT: I think the answer to your
7	question is going to be no, there is no definitive
8	criteria.
9	MEMBER POWERS: Well, clearly 100 percent
10	inspection on the ninth year would probably be
11	sufficient. It's hard to argue with that one.
12	DR. CHEN: Right.
13	MEMBER POWERS: Okay. Now, is 90 percent
14	inspection in the ninth year sufficient?
15	DR. CHEN: Supported by an additional ten
16	percent to be performed in the last year. That would
17	also be sufficient.
18	MEMBER POWERS: In other words, we're
19	going to have to inspect the whole damn thing in the
20	last two years.
21	DR. CHEN: You identified a sample of a
22	high-risk area. Whether that identified sample is 100
23	locations or 50 locations, it's up to the applicant to
24	come
25	MEMBER BONACA: So you are not looking for

1	a high susceptibility? You are looking for a
2	high-risk area?
3	DR. CHEN: High-risk area.
4	MEMBER BONACA: Now I can understand how
5	you can do that.
6	DR. CHEN: I like to see a few welds on
7	the valves, on the T's, on the elbows. Those are
8	inspected.
9	MEMBER BONACA: Let me ask you a question
10	now. Now you have a coated piping system that has
11	been in operation for at this point 49 years and
12	hasn't developed a hole in it. Okay?
13	DR. CHEN: Yes.
14	MEMBER BONACA: I would tend to conclude
15	that that piece of pipe is well-wrapped, I mean, if it
16	isn't stainless steel and it isn't copper but it is
17	just an iron pipe. I mean, I like the idea that you
18	have to have some periodicity to it because it's
19	consistent with GALL, but I begin to question about
20	digging around after 49 years of operation when I
21	haven't had a lick.
22	I don't know you will have a comment on
23	that.
24	DR. CHEN: Yes. In commenting to that, I
25	would like to point out there are two other exceptions

1 that are quoted in the program. The two exceptions are addressing the scope beyond currently required by 2 the GALL. 3 4 Now, the applicant voluntarily put it in 5 there. They want to inspect stainless steel and copper alloy. They want to inspect unwrapped, 6 7 uncoated, piping. And if you find lots of material in the uncoated, unwrapped piping area, there has to be 8 an evaluation and going through the plant procedures 9 to evaluate that. Those are beyond the GALL. 10 So all of these exceptions, as I listed in 11 the program, are really enhancement improvement in 12 13 nature. 14 MEMBER BONACA: Okay. 15 MEMBER POWERS: Given that we don't have understanding of 16 what an engineering 17 evaluation is going to be right now, the licensee is going to come in here. And I will bet that he will 18 19 say in the tenth year that enough has been done and 20 that everything is good. How are you going to know 21 whether to believe that or not? I mean, he will be 22 totally factual in what he sends you, but whether that 23 is sufficient or not. 24 DR. KUO: Well, Dr. Powers, if I may 25 comment on this, the NRC process really is a process

1	of trust and verify. Okay? To some degree, we have
2	to trust the ability of the applicant to do the right
3	thing.
4	MEMBER POWERS: He's going to write you a
5	very nice report that said, "I did this and this,
6	this, this," and it will be well-justified.
7	DR. KUO: If we have any doubt at all, we
8	could go there to audit to inspect.
9	MEMBER POWERS: Yes, but the question is
10	sufficiency.
11	DR. KUO: Well, let me talk about it as an
12	engineer. As an engineer, when I have problems like
13	this, I would have locations inspected. It may be a
14	few, maybe not a whole lot, maybe just a few.
15	But if I see degradation signs there, I'm
16	going to start looking into more. I'm going to expand
17	my samples. That's the nature of the evaluation.
18	I don't think we can ask the applicant to
19	go there to, say, take 100 percent, to inspection 100
20	percent of locations. I think that's not what we
21	want.
22	They could inspect a few critical
23	locations, but if they ever find any degradation size,
24	then definitely as an engineer, I would expand my
25	samples again.

1	MEMBER POWERS: I mean, you've picked the
2	easy one. Now pick a hard one: the next five
3	locations and there are no signs.
4	DR. KUO: And that is why I am saying I am
5	taking the critical locations.
6	MEMBER POWERS: Take the five critical
7	locations and there are no signs of degradation or
8	not. Is that sufficient?
9	DR. KUO: Well, if there are no signs of
10	degradation in critical locations, I have to conclude
11	that there is no problem.
12	MEMBER POWERS: Well, now, how can you
13	conclude that? I wouldn't conclude that at all.
14	DR. CHEN: If I say we inspect ten and
15	find no problem, would that satisfy your needs?
16	MEMBER POWERS: You haven't helped me a
17	bit. Until you get to 100 percent I'm still asking
18	you, how do you know how to extrapolate from a finite
19	set to the complete set?
20	MR. MacFARLANE: If I may, this is Mike
21	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: I think we established
22	they don't know.
23	MEMBER POWERS: Okay. How do you find
24	out?
25	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Well, I think if you

keep questioning, you won't get an answer.

DR. KUO: Instead of answering this tough question directly, can I go indirectly? Inspections and audits are two activities going in this state in parallel to the license renewal application stage, but after granting the license, before entering the extended period of operation, the inspection teams in the regional sites, site inspections, if you're going to verify or check into what extent they inspect.

Now, you may say the inspectors, they don't have the knowledge of deciding, they don't have the expertise of deciding what is critical and how many critical are there and how many occasions inspected, but in the last few trips, we went to different sites.

The site inspectors and auditing members are working together in several areas. This is one of the areas. So we are kind of transporting the knowledge to the inspectors. And the inspectors by their professional experience, they will identify. When they have lack of professional expertise to handle that, they come back to the audit team. And we'll do that at that point.

If you challenge the audit team will have enough expertise, we will have to see at that time who

is in the audit team.

MR. MacFARLANE: If I may, I'd like to try to help you out with this a little bit. This is Mike MacFarlane.

What they are really talking about here is for us for coated piping, it was all put in at the same time. It's all the same pipe. It's all the same process used to coat. So what you're really looking at is a sampling process.

And we're looking for an actual failure of coating from the standpoint of adherence and degradation, general degradation. It's not looking for the needle in a haystack of a localized failure due to like a rock. The typical failures we see in these lines are really related to nicking of a coating during installation.

And so what this is really looking at, the intent is to verify that with a coating itself in the general sense. It's still staying in here. It's still good quality. It's still a valid coating.

The engineering evaluation is to look at how many times have we dug this up, what have we dug up to come up with have we gotten the population, do we have a sufficient basis, sampling basis, to really say we have looked at that.

1 Ι don't know if that answers your 2 question, but that is really the goal of the things 3 that --4 MEMBER POWERS: Well, what you described the process -- and I can almost sit down and 5 scratch out at least the table of contents of the 6 7 report you're going to send to the staff right now. And that's what I would do as well. 8 My question to them is, having gotten this 9 report, which will have all this information you 10 11 outlined, they placed a sufficiency condition on it. 12 How do you know whether it's sufficient or not? Since you're going to be the first one 13 14 that's going to trot one of these reports out or at 15 least the first one promised to trot one of these reports out, they can't go looking at a bunch of other 16 17 reports like this. I mean, you know, you're going to describe 18 19 a population. You're going to describe your findings. 20 Let us presume, for sake of argument, that there is 21 nothing, zip, everything is in pristine condition and 22 every place you looked, but it's a finite set. 23 you're going to make an argument. I'll bet you make 24 the basian argument. And you're going to send it to

And they've got to decide on sufficiency.

them.

there will be a subjectivity to it because I'll bet 1 2 it's a basian argument. DR. CHEN: 3 There are standards that people 4 follow to evaluate if you're doing a statistical 5 sample. Normally people review those based on the meritory standards for a general sample, but in this 6 7 case, we are really reviewing a biased sample, I mean, 8 the sample at the locations where those degradations 9 are most likely to occur. 10 So if someone reviews a biased sample and also achieves a 95-95 level, I think that's the best 11 assurance you can get for myself to assure myself 12 that, hey, this program is properly implemented and 13 14 the likelihood to have no value is very high, 95-95. 15 MEMBER KRESS: You are talking about a 16 random set when you're talking about 95-95. 17 DR. CHEN: Yes. MEMBER KRESS: I don't see much randomness 18 19 in this process. 20 MEMBER POWERS: We're still on 95. 21 have to have 95 percent confidence there are zero 22 I mean, you can't tolerate five percent failures. 23 failures in this line. 24 MEMBER ROSEN: Very wet site. 25 MR. MacFARLANE: I understand the status.

1 MEMBER BONACA: All right. Well, then we 2 will proceed now. MS. LIU: All right. For aging management 3 4 in scope in accessible concrete, it's on this table. 5 PH level colorized itself at Farley as within the Therefore, the below-grade 6 acceptable limit. 7 environment at Farley is not considered aggressive and that there is no history of aging, degradation, or 8 9 failure of concrete components exposed 10 below-grade environment in Farley. While sampling is not performed on a 11 12 routine basis, the phosphate level is .03 ppm sample from the surface water pond. The surface water pond 13 14 is a source of water for the surface water system. 15 Structures exposed to the pond water are the surface 16 water structures. The other structures are exposed to 17 groundwater. And there was no detectable phosphate in 18 the groundwater samples. 19 On section 4, time of the aging --20 MEMBER POWERS: Is that because the 21 phosphate at all reacted with the concrete? 22 David Jeng, would you like to MS. LIU: 23 answer that question? Well, it didn't take any 24 MEMBER POWERS: 25 phosphate in the groundwater. And I just wondered if

1 all phosphate had reacted with the concrete. 2 MR. JENG: This is David Jeng. is not known 3 Phosphate to have any 4 cementing effect on concrete. If you go through all 5 the areas of the research, that has been there. that's under the industry. 6 7 So the answer is no. They are not 8 believed to be going to have impact on the integrity 9 of the concrete. 10 MEMBER POWERS: I don't agree, but we'll 11 go on. 12 MR. JENG: Thank you. Okay. Section 4, time of the 13 MS. LIU: aging analysis for the reactor vessel shop energy and 14 15 PTS, as you can tell from the first table, for both Unit 1 and Unit 2 at Farley, they are both within the 16 acceptable range. And the values calculated by the 17 staff and the applicant are very close. 18 19 These values are based on a quarter to 20 neutron fluence values at the end of extended period 21 of operation; in other words, 54 effective for power 22 years. The second table is where we have the 23 24 pressurized thermal shock. As you can tell, the 25 values again are within the acceptable range.

1 the staff-calculated value and the 2 applicant-calculated value, they are very close as 3 And these are based on fluence values for base 4 metal occasions of the reactor vessels. 5 On metal fatigue, we have the fatigue of ASME class I components. There are two components 6 7 that make the fatigue cumulative users' factor of 1.0. And they are the charging nozzle and are a safety 8 9 injection nozzle to the RCS cold leg. The applicant's corrective action would 10 11 include one or more of the following four options. 12 further refinement of the fatigue analysis, They are: 13 repair, replacement, or management of the fatigue 14 effects through the use of an NRC augmenting 15 inspection program for the fatigue of reactor coolant pump flywheel, which is based on a bounding analysis 16 6,000 start/stop cycles, 17 and .08inches allowable crack growth. 18 19 The analysis on the reactor coolant pump 20 flywheel remains to be valid and continue to have 21 sufficient margin against fracture for the period of 22 extended operation. 23 Finally, on the fatique of ASME non-class 24 1 components, -- these are based on ASME class 2 and

3 and ANSI standards -- while most piping systems

1	within the scope of license renewal are bounded by
2	7,000 cycles, sampling was designed for 22,000 cycles.
3	And the analysis for these systems remains to be valid
4	during the period of extended operation.
5	On containment tendon prestress, applicant
6	provided training analysis, as you can tell from this
7	table here. We have the trend line values at 40 years
8	and at 60 years. They are, again, all within the
9	acceptable range.
10	The next slide is the trend line that the
11	applicant provided for this
12	MEMBER KRESS: Before you leave that
13	slide, as you know, real data turns ACRS on. I'd like
14	to ask a couple of questions about it. Number one,
15	what exactly is the liftoff?
16	MS. LIU: I would like to ask Mr. Hans
17	Ashar to answer this question.
18	MR. ASHAR: I am Hans Ashar. Could you
19	repeat the question again? I didn't because I was on
20	that side
21	MEMBER KRESS: Looking at the y-axis, what
22	exactly is a liftoff?
23	MR. ASHAR: On y-axis, what we have is a
24	liftoff of forces expressed in caps for a tendon.
25	Pressuring tendon is the one which imparts the
ļ	I and the second

1	composition to the concrete.
2	MEMBER KRESS: These are hoop tendons.
3	MR. ASHAR: This is only one example given
4	for hoop tendon here, but they have developed tendon
5	lines for the vertical tendons, long tendons for both
6	the units.
7	MEMBER KRESS: Tell me what a liftoff is.
8	MR. ASHAR: Liftoff, there is a tendon on
9	anchorage. They pulled the anchorage up to a very
10	small amount, about one-sixteenth of an inch, and
11	measured the amount of liftoff testing.
12	MEMBER KRESS: And you get a zero force at
13	some point. Is that
14	MR. ASHAR: Well, if it is not
15	sufficiently pulled, like one-sixteenth which I'm
16	talking about, from the bearing plate, it would show
17	very low pressuring. But the requirement is it should
18	be completely independent from the bearing plate.
19	MEMBER KRESS: Now let me ask a couple of
20	other questions.
21	MR. ASHAR: Sure.
22	MEMBER KRESS: The trend line, I presume
23	that must be related to creep effects.
24	MR. ASHAR: Yes, yes. That is the whole
25	idea because it is very difficult to predict precisely

1	each and every tendon's pressuring force because we
2	are going by sampling here. And so what we are doing
3	is that at a certain interval, they took these liftoff
4	measurements for the pressuring tendons. And then
5	they combined them together. They used the list
6	square method for regression analysis and developed
7	these trend lines.
8	That means they are to be randomly
9	selected samples for 200 tendons. They make ten
10	tendons every time.
11	MEMBER KRESS: So each of these years'
12	samples are not the same tendons? They are different?
13	MR. ASHAR: No, they are not the same
14	tendons. Correct.
15	MEMBER KRESS: If they were the same
16	tendons, would you be able to predict the trend line
17	because it's creep-related?
18	MR. ASHAR: Well, no. Creep and shrink
19	are part of the lessening of the tension in the
20	pressuring, I mean, the flex itself in the measure of
21	pressuring forces.
22	MEMBER KRESS: Well, I still have a Dana
23	Powers' question on sufficiency here. If these are
24	not the same tendons,
25	MR. ASHAR: Yes.

1 MEMBER KRESS: -- how many do you have to 2 do to get a trend line? 3 MR. ASHAR: Well, I can give you quite a 4 history on this one because we have gone through a lot 5 of gyrations on the sample size of the tendons during the earlier years during when the pressure test 6 7 concrete containments came into the picture. 8 had a number of people suggesting that, hey, you've 9 got to take at least ten tendons, even for the 10 infinite population of the tendons. It will take at least ten tendons to make it a more valid statistical 11 12 correlation here. And so we started with the first reg guide 13 14 on this particular item, in which for hoop tendons, 15 they were supposed to take ten tendons. For vertical, they were a little less because the population 16 17 generally is less. The whole idea here was to not put 18 19 licensees into kind of heavy expenses for doing this 20 work because it is an expensive item taking liftoff 21 testing, sometimes detationing also. And so there was 22 a compromise reached with the industry through a 23 number of negotiations through about 30 years of 24 history on pressuring tendon.

MEMBER KRESS:

25

Is the assumption that this

1	trend line applies to the whole population of tendons?
2	MR. ASHAR: The whole tendon. That's
3	correct, yes.
4	MEMBER KRESS: Well, how does that
5	translate into potential containment failure? How
6	does that affect the containment failure probability?
7	MR. ASHAR: Well, there is a separate
8	study done. And we also had a separate model testing
9	done by the Office of Research on pressure test
LO	concrete containment models. That gives certain
L1	insight into how much loss you can really tolerate
L2	without compromising the capacity of the containment.
L3	MEMBER KRESS: Is that the basis for this
L4	red
L5	MR. ASHAR: No, no, absolutely not.
L6	MEMBER KRESS: What's the basis for the
L7	minimum
L8	MR. ASHAR: This is completely estimated.
L9	There is no risk-informed. The only thing, it is a
20	statistically derived trend line.
21	MEMBER KRESS: What is the basis of the
22	red line?
23	MR. ASHAR: The red line is a minimum
24	pressuring force that they need to have in order to
25	satisfy the design conditions.
I	I and the state of

1 MEMBER KRESS: What is the basis for it, 2 though? 3 MR. ASHAR: The basis is to take the force 4 that they are going to impart. This is all estimated. 5 Then they considerably put the break coefficient, the shrinkage factor, the arrestical stressing of steel, 6 7 and arrestic shortening of the structure itself. 8 these things are considered arriving at that line, 9 that red line. 10 That is done during the construction of 11 the line. It's not done later on. They have to make 12 sure that they can take the internal pressure without too much of a tension into the concrete. 13 MEMBER KRESS: I wouldn't worry about a 14 15 trend line that is completely dominated in one set of 16 data at three years. 17 MR. ASHAR: It's not one set of data. model dosers is a continuing process. This is not the 18 19 end of this line. Okay? 20 What is going to happen is that the next 21 five years, they will be doing another inspection. 22 They will be taking more liftoff testing. If this 23 trend line changes, it changes, whatever comes out of 24 the regression analysis. 25 MEMBER KRESS: Well, I must say --

1	MEMBER POWERS: Who believes this?
2	MEMBER KRESS: this discussed has left
3	me baffled. Let's go on.
4	MEMBER POWERS: Well, really, let me be
5	equally baffled, Tom. That's not a trend line.
6	That's an outlier line.
7	MEMBER KRESS: That's right.
8	MR. ASHAR: Which one is that?
9	MEMBER POWERS: That's not a trend line.
10	That's an outlier line.
11	MEMBER KRESS: I would wonder about those
12	samples taken a
13	MEMBER POWERS: I mean, I have no idea how
14	they ran that line through there, but if they did a
15	least squares analysis, they're crazy. Do an L-1
16	analysis on that. And that trend line will disappear
17	in an instant. It will be a constant.
18	MEMBER KRESS: Yes, yes. Constant would
19	be better
20	MEMBER POWERS: Yes.
21	MEMBER KRESS: for sampling safety. I
22	have no argument with that, but still it baffles me.
23	MEMBER RANSOM: It also looks like if you
24	were to put a 95 percent confidence limit in that,
25	that it would probably be lower than

1	MR. ASHAR: Yes. You are quite right.
2	And if you consider if there is enough statistical
3	liftoff testing done and you can come out with a 90
4	percent confidence level, it will be lower than this
5	trend line I give you.
6	MEMBER KRESS: I would assume that the red
7	line has some consideration of that kind of certainty
8	in. That's why I asked, what's the basis for the red
9	line? I really don't yet. It's, you know
10	MR. ASHAR: I can explain to you again how
11	the baseline and if the applicant wants to put
12	their own thing as to how they have constructed the
13	red line, I would appreciate that.
14	MR. MacFARLANE: The red line is basically
15	the containment design analysis value for tension that
16	we use to prove that the containment design will be
17	sufficient for design, which is 54 psig. And then
18	there's always conservatism in that calculation, but
19	that's the basis of it.
20	MEMBER KRESS: At least I understand that.
21	MEMBER POWERS: Thank you.
22	MS. LIU: There are three other TLAs, one
23	being the ultimate heat sink, 1,325-acre feed for
24	surface water pond. That's the ultimate heat sink,
25	what was used in the FSAR. The average measured pond

1 volume is 1,418.5-acre feed taken from 12 sets of data 2 over the last 22 years. 3 Staff performed an independent linear 4 regression analysis. And the minimum recorded 5 ultimate heat sink pump volume is 1,403-acre feed, as you can tell. So they are all within the acceptable 6 7 range. relief 8 For the RHR valve capacity verification calculations, the applicant has committed 9 in commitment number 15 that it is to update an 10 analysis to include a calculated 54 EFPY PT limit 11 12 curves prior to the period of extended operation. And, finally, on the leak before break 13 14 analysis, the applicant's LBB analysis has been 15 demonstrated and continues to be valid during the period of extended operation. 16 17 So, in conclusion, as I stated earlier, Farley's new application has met the requirements of 18 19 10 CFR Part 54 in terms of scoping and screening A&Ps, 20 AMRs, and TLAA. 21 That concludes the staff's presentation. 22 DR. KUO: Thank you, Tilda. And that 23 concludes the staff part of this presentation. 24 MEMBER RANSOM: I have a kind of a general 25 question, nothing I guess related to this specific

1 one, but as we are moving towards new plant building, 2 the expectation is that they will actually have lower risk in terms of core damage frequency than the 3 4 existing plants. And I'm wondering if there shouldn't 5 be an expectation of license renewal that there will actually be an improvement in safety during the 6 7 license renewal period. I mean, this is overlapping at a time when 8 9 we expect significant improvement in safety margin. 10 That may not be in the current rule, but it would seem like it ought to be an expectation. 11 12 Everything you point to points reduction in margin with time. So I don't think you 13 14 can argue that there is no reduction in margin. 15 only arguments I've ever heard are that we simply meet 16 the current licensing basis in terms of safety conditions. 17 Anybody else? 18 MEMBER BONACA: 19 MEMBER SIEBER: No. 20 MEMBER POWERS: I mean, it's outside Yes. 21 the scope of the current rule. It would take a rule 22 change to do that. MEMBER BONACA: This is the first time 23 24 that we have raised this question. I think it's a

valid question.

1 MEMBER POWERS: Yes. We brought it up 2 before renewal. 3 MEMBER BONACA: What criteria. 4 some point we have evaluated whether or not we felt 5 the rule was appropriate. It was. And I think it is 6 an important question. And I think it certainly 7 places further burden on the existing operators to 8 assure that all these commitments, et cetera, that we 9 made because of aging are fulfilled because clearly there is a reduction in some margin of components. 10 I think, however, in terms of reduction of 11 the margin, it's true that most of these components 12 have substantial margin. And what we are looking for 13 14 is confirmation that the reduction in margin, in fact, is not going to affect the safety of the component 15 itself. 16 I think some of the studies we have had, 17 for example, the one on the PS rule, where we sharpen 18 19 our pencils there, it seems to indicate, in fact, a 20 level of margin that was beyond what was thought to be 21 there in the vessels, for example. 22 I dare say that if we did the 23 evaluation on other components, we will find probably 24 very similar results. So I don't think we should

leave an impression that these plants are degrading,

I think it is my judgment, to the point of creating a 1 2 separate issue. 3 It is a fact that for new plants, there 4 are expectations that go beyond what this current 5 generation of plants is capable of. MEMBER SHACK: I just had one question. 6 7 Back this scoping criteria for the spray interaction with the low-energy lines and the spaces 8 9 approach, is that the industry recommended? 10 NEI guidance on the way to do that? Are we going to see that for most of the applications in the future? 11 12 I believe Mr. Greg LIU: Yes. MS. Galletti is here. He can address that question for 13 14 you. 15 I'm Greg Galletti from the MR. GALLETTI: staff. 16 You are speaking specifically of 17 20-foot criteria? 18 19 MEMBER SHACK: Yes versus the spaces 20 approach. 21 GALLETTI: They are really not MR. different. 22 What was going on here is in general all 23 applicants use a spaces approach. What they try to do 24 is limit, of course, that space. So what they do is 25 they implement some additional criteria.

1	For instance, you would have a
2	safety-related building. Essentially the entire
3	safety-related building would be in scope. But then
4	in certain cubicles or certain areas, they would then
5	try to limit further what exactly would be
6	MEMBER SHACK: Things like where you had
7	walls, rather than 20 feet.
8	MR. GALLETTI: Right, right.
9	Normally if you have barriers like that, a wall of
10	some sort, a physical device, like a spray shield,
11	something like that, they would limit what's the A-2
12	items to include within that that boundary.
13	In this case, the 20-foot criteria was
14	something that the industry was proposing.
15	MEMBER SHACK: Okay.
16	MR. GALLETTI: And, again, in the I-9510,
17	Rev. 5, I guess draft Rev. 5, Appendix F, which is the
18	document, essentially that was the impetus for doing
19	that. We have taken exception to that.
20	And since that, that revision has been
21	changed. But at the time Farley was going through it,
22	that's where we were.
23	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Are there any more
24	questions from Committee members?
25	(No response.)

1	MEMBER BONACA: If none, I'll give it back
2	to you, Mr. Chairman.
3	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Well, thank you very
4	much for a good presentation from the industry and
5	from the staff. We appreciate it. And we'll adjourn
6	for 15 minutes, time for a break. Recess.
7	(Whereupon, the foregoing matter went off
8	the record at 10:06 a.m. and went back on the record
9	at 10:22 a.m.)
10	MEMBER POWERS: "Good Practices for
11	Implementing Human Reliability Analysis." George, I
12	want to hand it over to you.
13	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Okay. Thank you.
14	3) NUREG-1792, "GOOD PRACTICES FOR
15	IMPLEMENTING
16	HUMAN RELIABILITY ANALYSIS"
17	3.1) REMARKS BY THE COGNIZANT SUBCOMMITTEE
18	CHAIRMAN
19	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: The staff has
20	developed a draft NUREG report entitled "Good
21	Practices for Implementing Human Reliability
22	Analysis." And we received the first draft in April
23	of last year.
24	Now, what the staff means by "good
25	practices" is that there are a number of processes and

analysis tasks that are expected to be found in any HRA if the HRA is to be of some value.

We reviewed the first draft. And we issued a letter in May of last year. And we stated that the draft NUREG report should be issued for public comment. And we recommended that it should be peer-reviewed by domestic and international experts. We expressed our usual disappointment of not seeing organizational issues be treated the way we think they deserve to be treated.

A month later, in June of 2004, we received the EDO's response, in which the staff stated that they agreed with us that developing a set of good practices for assessing human reliability is very challenging and that the draft NUREG report would benefit from a review by domestic and international experts. They also agreed with us that organizational issues are potentially significant performance-shaping factors.

And they issued the report for public comment. They received the public comments. And on March of this year, the staff issued the revised version of the report, which we have. And it was revised to address the comments the staff received through the public review and comment period, which

lasted until, I understand, October of last year.

And they have an Appendix C, where they note how they responded to the comments they received.

And they state, the staff states, that very few comments, if any, actually, took real issue with the draft NUREG. And most of the comments addressed issues of clarification. I'm sure the staff will walk us through them today.

As a result of this, this revision that we have really is not very much different from the first draft we had except for the five or seven points that have been clarified.

Of course, the issue of organizational factors has to wait for better times, when we will not know more about it. The staff plans to have additional interactions with HRA experts.

I understand they are in the process of organizing a workshop sometime maybe in June or July. And the only point, if there is a point, of potential disagreement here is the way the staff interpreted our recommendation for a peer review. Essentially what they did, my understanding is what they did, is they sent a report to people. And they said, you know, "Would you please read this and tell us what you think?"

And given the record this agency has with peer reviews, that's probably not one of the best peer reviews, but we will have to listen to the staff and see what they learned from this. Certainly the ACRS had something else in mind when we recommended a peer review.

The reason, really, for the peer review or a more formal peer review is that the whole effort on HRA has been going on now for a number of years within the agency and its contractors, but also there are other groups, both domestic and internationally, that have been developing their own methods and models.

My impression is that the two groups or the many groups, they talk to each other at meetings, but I haven't really seen, say, a report from the NRC that says, you know, "We are changing ATHEANA this way because this group is developing their own method, and we think this is a good idea, what they are doing."

In other words, there doesn't seem to be a cross-fertilization. And I think at some point, we have to have that, especially for such an important issue. And maybe this report is a good place to start. But, again, we'll have to hear from the staff what kinds of comments they got and how they handle them and what we can do about this issue of peer

1	review. And I guess one of the questions is, is
2	holding a workshop a substitute for a peer review?
3	So, with those preliminary remarks, I will
4	turn it over to Erasmia or David.
5	3.2) BRIEFING BY AND DISCUSSIONS WITH
6	REPRESENTATIVES OF THE NRC STAFF
7	MR. LEW: Good morning. Yes. My name is
8	Dave Lew. I am the Chief of the PRA Branch. I just
9	wanted to make a couple of introductory remarks before
10	I turn the presentation over to Erasmia.
11	First, I do like to thank the Committee
12	for the comments that you provided us last year. I
13	think we have taken some of them. And I believe we
14	have proved the authority of the HRA guidance. So we
15	do appreciate that.
16	The purpose of today's meeting is a status
17	briefing of the practices. This is an informational
18	briefing. So we are not requesting a letter from you.
19	We are planning to issue the practices this month as
20	a NUREG CR. So with that
21	MEMBER SHACK: As a NUREG or as a NUREG
22	CR?
23	MS. LOIS: NUREG.
24	MR. LEW: NUREG. I'm sorry. Yes. That's
25	right. NUREG.

1	With that, let me just introduce the
2	people supporting this. We do have Erasmia and Susan
3	and myself. We also have Alan Kolaczkowski on the
4	phone. And Jay Persensky is here on the side to help
5	answer any questions because I know there was some
6	interest with regard to organizational factors and
7	such. And we have gotten different
8	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: And Jay has solved
9	the issue?
LO	(Laughter.)
L1	MEMBER ROSEN: I want to make sure that
L2	you don't underestimate the importance of this
L3	document in the sense that practitioners will begin
L4	using and modifying and improving things and enhancing
L5	the way they do business on the basis of this. So it
L6	will begin to prompt change. So if it's not complete,
L7	if it's wrong, it has impacts.
L8	MR. LEW: Okay. With that, let me just
L9	turn it over to Erasmia for presentation.
20	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Good.
21	MS. LOIS: Thank you very much.
22	I would like to remind that the names
23	here, mine, Susan's, and Alan's, are just the people
24	who are going to hep out. Probably we will have Jay
25	help out in the presentation. However, the work has

1 been done by Sandia National Laboratories. And many 2 other people contributed, John Forester of Sandia 3 National Laboratories as well as Gareth Perry. 4 really helped out in a significant way on this work as 5 well as Susan and several others in NRC and consultants. 6 7 The good practices is what we call phase one in developing and human reliability. And now this 8 9 is guidance. Phase two includes the comparison of existing methods or the evaluation of existing methods 10 with respect to the good practices. 11 12 So we view the good practices as kind of the foundation for discussing the differences and 13 14 methods and their capability to address specific 15 regulatory applications. 16 MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: That is a verv 17 interesting comment you just made, Erasmia. In other words, this document will be the standard against 18 which these other methods would be evaluated. 19 20 In a way because, of course, it MS. LOIS: 21 expresses the NRC staff views, but it documents the 22 widely accepted practices, the practices, for 23 performing human reliability analysis. As a matter of fact, we started out by 24

this work, developing actually guidance development,

by evaluating looking at this individual method; for example, prepare ATHEANA, et cetera, and making statements, "This is good" and "This is not good enough." And we had to say, "Good enough with respect to what?"

So then we realized that we need to express out to document our opinion on what are good practices and then go to the next step, which is evaluation the strength and limitations of methods with respect to availability to be used by regulatory applications.

MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: But what if there is some idea in some other model that you were not aware of or have not appreciated? So you have not included the result in good practice her.

In other words, it shouldn't be a one-way street, where you use this as a standard and you say, "Now I'm going to look at this guy's method and say whether it is good or bad because there may be some good elements in that method that should be in the good practices document."

MS. LOIS: That's why the good practices stayed at the generic level, not method-specific level. And once we started talking about the various methods and their strengths and limitations, we may

1 have to come back and say, you know, some aspects have 2 not been encompassed. 3 MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Yes. That's a point. 4 That's a point. 5 MS. LOIS: Yes. 6 MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Good. 7 MS. LOIS: Okay. So the objective of this 8 briefing is to explain to the ACRS how we addressed 9 your comments mentioned before -- we briefed you in 10 April, both the subcommittee and the full Committee, and also we received a letter from you -- and also to 11 explain what are the comments we received from the 12 public and what we did, how we addressed that. 13 14 Overall where the ACRS comments made for 15 more international representation practitioners within now peer review, we acknowledged the work 16 outside of the NRC and even the U.S., clarified the 17 purpose and the use of the document, clarified how 18 19 good practices compare with the state-of-the-art, 20 address management organizational issues, and also provide a variety of individual comments. 21 obtaining food from international 22 23 representations, we actively pursued it. Yes, we did 24 not have a peer review in a formal sense.

should note that we received more specific comments

1	from the international stakeholders.
2	Domestically, the EPRI provided formal
3	comments and just one individual. Here we have many
4	more people participating and probably encompassing
5	the well-known HRA
6	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Did these people send
7	you e-mails or letters with comments?
8	MS. LOIS: E-mail.
9	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: They did?
10	MS. LOIS: Yes.
11	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: And they had detailed
12	comments?
13	MS. LOIS: Detailed comments that I
14	mean, I have probably glanced through backup slide.
15	I thought you would ask the question, George.
16	Sixteen, would you please? Oh, I have to do it
17	myself?
18	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: We don't have 16.
19	MS. LOIS: No, you don't have 16. It's a
20	backup.
21	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Yes. We should still
22	have the backup slides. So what do you want? You
23	want to find number 16? Okay.
24	MS. LOIS: Yes, I want to find number 16.
25	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Very good.

1 MS. LOIS: Okay. I'm sorry. Apparently 2 I don't have slide 16. 3 MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Okay. 4 MS. LOIS: I cut it off. But I can 5 summarize it here. MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: 6 Yes. 7 LOIS: We have several positive 8 It's of high-quality, useful to 9 practitioners, level of detail appropriate, 10 state-of-the-art, adequately reflected, 11 discussions on specific PSS may help to reduce the 12 risk from overlooking core conditions. Those are the positive comments. 13 14 A couple of accurate domestic comments on 15 the use of existing plan and industry experimental data: recommending to use the experimental data. And 16 we had some strong criticism for not emphasizing 17 enough the use of errors of commission and providing 18 19 more detailed guidance and strongly recommending their 20 As a matter of fact, verbally I did not do a list because if I go to slide 8, that includes the 21 22 international comments. MEMBER ROSEN: Lois, that reminds me. 23 24 you get the EPRI comments you mentioned? 25 MS. LOIS: Yes.

1	MEMBER ROSEN: Was it easy to see
2	practitioner comments or was it just the EPRI staff?
3	Could you tell that they were coming from people who
4	were out there in the industry via EPRI?
5	MS. LOIS: Yes, yes, because the EPRI
6	comments included not just "complaints," "How come
7	now?"; I'm going to cover it, "Are they going to be
8	back to the comments?"; et cetera, but they did
9	provide specific comments to clarify the good
10	practices. Some of them were suggesting to add
11	criteria. So they were very good detailed comments.
12	MEMBER ROSEN: So you think EPRI solicited
13	comments from
14	MS. LOIS: EPRI solicited comments. And
15	I am aware of HRA practitioners in the industry, Doug,
16	where it says are provided. His comments through EPRI
17	are supposed to go directly to this.
18	MEMBER ROSEN: Well, that's good.
19	MS. LOIS: So to go down
20	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Did EDF have a chance
21	to review it?
22	MS. LOIS: EDF sent us very specific, very
23	detailed comments, but it was too late for
23	detailed comments, but it was too late for incorporating them?

1	comments?
2	MS. LOIS: They did, yes.
3	MEMBER ROSEN: So what would you do with
4	them?
5	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: What was the flavor
6	of those comments?
7	MS. LOIS: Some of them were, "How come,"
8	you know, that "10-3 is a good value to reduce the
9	screen?" Some of them were along the lines of
10	everybody else. But we did not have the chance to
11	really go through in detail to incorporate to make
12	changes in this, but we're going to have more
13	discussions with EDF during this phase of work.
14	MEMBER ROSEN: And you plan a future
15	revision of this to incorporate the knowledge?
16	MS. LOIS: I think it should be on the
17	basis of experience we get from potentially licensees
18	using the good practices and also what it will come
19	out from the phase two, which is the evaluation of
20	methods.
21	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Are you going to talk
22	about the phase two later?
23	MS. LOIS: Yes, if needed. So, then,
24	quickly, acknowledging the work outside, we audit
25	references, clarify the purpose.

1	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Did acknowledging this
2	work lead to any changes in what you did or did you
3	just acknowledge it?
4	MS. LOIS: We felt that the draft version
5	reflected the international work because
6	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Susan is
7	international.
8	MS. LOIS: Susan is international. Alan
9	is international. I don't want
10	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Yes. But you
11	remember the workshop in Brussels, that both you and
12	I were there. The French representative from EDF kept
13	telling us that their method is different from
14	everybody else's. You know, whatever issue would come
15	up were different.
16	When are we going to put an end to that?
17	Did they buy into this and they said, "No," you know?
18	MS. LOIS: Oh, yes, they did.
19	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: If we implement our
20	methodology or if somebody applies this practices
21	document, then that is a good foundation for us to
22	apply our method that we expect to see all of these
23	things or this is just ATHEANA and we are going a
24	different way? That is what disturbs me, when people
25	or major organizations say, "We are different. We are

1	going a different way."
2	MS. LOIS: Let me answer these two
3	questions and then if Susan wants to answer it.
4	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Yes.
5	MS. LOIS: The comments that the French
6	sent would not alter the good practices. There were
7	specific comments to say, "Why? How do you know that
8	10-3 is good enough?"
9	The other thing is that MERMOS would like
10	to compare HEEN and MERMOS with IDUC. So then at that
11	point, we will be able to actually understand what
12	MERMOS is and how different that is.
13	Now, could that stop the French saying
14	that we're different? I'm not quite sure because they
15	have
16	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: No, but that's why I
17	want you to talk about phase two later. You say
18	you're going to compare the various methods that are
19	out there, MERMOS or IDUC from Maryland and whatever
20	else is there, compare them with this document. But
21	you will compare them also to each other to see what
22	differences there are?
23	MS. LOIS: We believe that through
24	comparing with the good practices the individual
25	methods we will identify if there are differences.

1 And then it should be phase three where we can now 2 sit down and say, "Okay. These are the 3 differences among methods, how important they are, the 4 differences. Should we come into the meeting of the 5 minds and try to address the differences, et cetera?" MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: 6 Susan? 7 MS. COOPER: Yes. Susan Cooper. 8 quess the one thing that I think 9 deserves reiteration from the presentation from last year is that the good practices focuses on the process 10 for performing HRA, not so much the quantification 11 12 method. In fact, many HRA methods really just 13 14 focus on that quantification step and are silent, 15 really, on the point of the actual process. There are very few methods or approaches out there that can 16 really be said to address the process. That is, these 17 are the steps for performing HRA. 18 19 You collect information. You identify the human failure events. You model the human failure 20 21 events. You incorporate them in the PRA. You 22 quantify them. Those are the kinds of steps that are 23 principally addressed in the good practices. 24 Now, there are some things about

are addressed

quantification that

25

good

in

the

practices document, but, as Erasmia mentioned, because we wanted to keep this generic so that we could use it as a basis for reviewing methods, there is not a lot of information in the good practices document about quantification. There is some but not a lot.

So the principal differences between methods are going to be in the area of quantification. So I think that's important to remember. And many of the methods that differ in their quantification approach will probably use the same approach to actually do the HRA, how they collect information, how they model events, how they put them in the PRA, that sort of thing.

MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: But quantification is not just numbers. I mean, there may be different modeling. Some parts of the model are common, I guess, with other models, but there may be others that are different.

In other words, quantification is not just playing with numbers. It's like I remember the IDUC presentation at that workshop. It looked different from ATHEANA. Now, if I have to spend three hours to actually dig in and figure out that it's not that different, that's a separate story. But it really looked different the way it was presented.

1 The question is, is there anything there 2 that is part of the process that Susan mentioned that 3 is different from what ATHEANA does and should be 4 here? And are you reasonably confident that there 5 isn't such a thing, that you have covered all bases? I think at this point in time 6 MS. COOPER: 7 we are, but, as Erasmia mentioned, if something should 8 come up in this second phase, where we are reviewing 9 the methods on the basis of the good practices, then 10 we can revise the good practices. MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: 11 Okay. I mean, the good practices 12 MS. COOPER: report is not intended to create a brand new process 13 14 for performing HRA. Rather, it's to provide guidance on sort of the quality or the standards by which you 15 16 things, make sure that gathering information 17 includes certain things, like you go and talk to the operating staff. 18 19 And some of these things have been done. 20 We formalized it. In some cases, we might have raised 21 the bar just a little bit or at least in some people's 22 minds, we have. But for the most part, it is simply 23 putting down in a formal way what people have been 24 doing and what we expect.

MS. LOIS: And, then, to emphasize a

little bit more, for example, what we saw in the IP review, people were forgetting the under-dependencies as part of the human reliability. And that was a big weakness. It doesn't matter what method you used. If you forget to address the dependencies, your bottom line number will be wrong.

So in a way, what we tried to address here is if you view the lack of consistency among HRA members to perform HRA overall from the minute you start to work until you use your quantification tool to come up with a number, in a van, having that quantification tool will have to address on the next phase how that --

MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: So in a sense, this is really similar to the ASME standard for PRA, which tells you what things ought to be in the PRA, but it sort of shies away from telling you this is how you would do common cause values, for examples, although sometimes it does give some additional advice. But, basically, it says this is the stuff that we want to see in a PRA. And you are doing the same thing here.

MS. LOIS: Exactly. As a matter of fact, I should have a slide to remind the Committee of that. The motivation for this guidance is to hep to support the implementation of reg guide 1-200.

1	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Yes.
2	MS. LOIS: And its elements are directly
3	related to the ASME standard. So it provides a lower
4	level, more detailed document, guidance on those
5	standards. That's why we did it.
6	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Okay. Let's move on
7	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: It reminds me a bit of
8	the courses on the scientific process that students
9	suffer through and really learn nothing because until
LO	they have actually done some science, they have no
L1	idea what it is about.
L2	You can emphasize all the process. That
L3	doesn't really teach people how to do it. So where do
L4	they learn how to really do this stuff, really
L5	evaluate some numbers which are meaningful?
L6	MEMBER ROSEN: When they are actually
L7	doing a PRA and there are human actions.
L8	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: There's no guidance on
L9	that?
20	MEMBER ROSEN: When there are human
21	actions needed to be modeled, that's when they get
22	down to brass tacks.
23	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: You remember the
24	Commission has directed the staff that we should have
25	standards and consensus documents and everything by

1	the end of 2008. And if there is a request that comes
2	to the agency that does not comply with these things,
3	then the staff will give it low priority.
4	So if we can view this as part of the
5	development of these consensus documents, in other
6	words, if somebody comes in and ignores three of the
7	good practices that this NUREG will have, then the
8	staff will say this is no good, right, without going
9	further.
10	MS. LOIS: And we'll get a little bit into
11	that.
12	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: That's how I okay.
13	Six is good. Keep going. Don't go back.
14	MS. LOIS: Okay.
15	MEMBER ROSEN: Well, wait a minute now.
16	(Laughter.)
17	MEMBER ROSEN: I have a set of comments
18	here that, rather than wait until the very end, I will
19	just bring them up as the subject is raised. On the
20	M&O factors, which in case anybody doesn't know what
21	that means, I think it means management and
22	organization.
23	With regard to those, the discussion on
24	the evolution of HRA thinking that's at the beginning
25	of section 3 on page 16 of the good practices, I think

1 it's very useful. And there's a list of context to be considered provided there, you know, such things as 2 3 plant behavior, timing, indications that the operators 4 have, et cetera. 5 No recognition is afforded, however, through the understanding that a full treatment of 6 7 context will include a consideration of organizational 8 influences on human performance M&O factors, 9 especially on the modeling of pre-initiated human 10 actions. I'm concerned, really, about 11 less 12 post-initiated human actions. There's so much attention to that. But the pre-initiated human 13 14 actions, the latent errors that are built into the 15 plant, start to border on the issue of safety culture. It's in that area where the major weakness of what we 16 are now doing is because we don't address that. 17 Ι understand that consideration of 18 19 organizational influences beyond the current state of 20 practice now is not probably beyond the 21 state-of-the-art. There are some promising ideas I 22 have seen, even some promising ideas by organizations 23 represented by members of this Committee, famous members of this Committee. 24

So I think reference should be made to the

1	need for continuing efforts to elucidate this
2	important context, the M&O factors, in the document.
3	We're going to go in and say, "No matter how much HRA
4	you do and how well you do it, if you don't do this
5	better, if we don't do this better, we will not be
6	getting the right answer. We're getting an answer.
7	It's better than no answer, but it may not be the
8	answer that we're looking for."
9	So I think it's very important to take the
10	opportunity in this area to put something more in the
11	document.
12	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: In this context, I
13	don't remember now. Does the document state
14	explicitly that you are not considering human errors,
15	pre-initiated human errors?
16	MS. COOPER: No.
17	MEMBER ROSEN: Well, I'll go back.
18	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: What are the good
19	practices for that?
20	MS. COOPER: Yes.
21	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: No. We're not
22	talking about the routine tests and maintenance and
23	the swaying type of things. No. I think what Steve
24	means is actions that may start an incident, an
25	initiating event.

MEMBER ROSEN: I want to address your comment, George, because I have a comment specifically about that. Pre-initiated, this is good practice number one in table 2-1 under "Pre-initiated." Let me read you what it says. "All routine (schedule) tests and maintenance as well as calibration procedures that affect equipment to be credited in the PRA should be identified and reviewed," all routine scheduled stuff.

MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Yes. I know.

MEMBER ROSEN: What that misses is that when you use operational event analysis, such as NEROP, we go back and look at an event that happened to try to assess its impact on the ROP, the NUREG needs to identify that, the analysis of unscheduled activities; that is, activities conducted because of emergent conditions, maybe more error-likely than scheduled activities due to they typically have more limited procedural coverage, there's more stress perhaps due to perceived or real time limitations on people dealing with an emergent condition.

So I think you ought to broaden the GP, number one, in the pre-initiators to include analysis of unscheduled activities as well as scheduled activities. And at the same time you do that, you might want to think about paying specific attention to

1 recently modified procedures or components because 2 they tend to be involved in emergent conditions. Yes. 3 MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: This is an 4 I think we have addressed it. And I mentioned 5 it to Erasmia some time ago in three ACRS letters in the past, right, that this is an area where we need to 6 7 do something, exactly what Mr. Rosen just said. 8 Maybe what you can do, I think this is an 9 area that has not really been explored, how you can 10 start initiators and so on. Maybe the best you can do here is just mention that it is not included, 11 12 something needs to be done. I will have probably Alan MS. LOIS: 13 14 respond to that and would like to make a note that the 15 previous version, the draft version, was noting that human influence, human contribution on initiating 16 17 events typically in PRAs has been incorporated as part of the equipment performance. 18 19 However, now we extended the text and 20 indicating that it would be beneficial to separately 21 analyze human performance for contributing 22 initiating events and when we note that the good 23 practices that we have for establishing would be 24 applicable for treating those initiating events

contributing practices.

1 Alan, do you want to answer? 2 MR. KOLACZKOWSKI: First of all, this is I think somebody needs to move the mike closer 3 4 to the phone. 5 MS. COOPER: It is. MR. KOLACZKOWSKI: In section 2.1 of the 6 7 document, we do address the subject of human-based initiators and the fact that the way PRA tends to be 8 done now, usually the initiator event frequencies that 9 are used already include both human-induced and 10 equipment-induced initiators. To the extent that that 11 12 is sufficient for whatever regulatory decision you're trying to make, then you're done. 13 You need to treat the human-induced 14 15 initiators separately or break out separately and model it separately because you actually have to study 16 the human-induced portion of the initiating event. 17 acknowledge 18 Then that the we 19 practices here to the extent a pre-initiator event 20 would play a role in the initiating event or whatever, 21 that the good practices here apply to however you're 22 modeling the human-induced portion of the initiating 23 event. 24 So I guess what I am trying to say is if 25 it's covered implicitly but we don't address it

1 explicitly in the GP document, they have a statement 2 about it in section 2.1. MS. COOPER: 3 This is Susan. I wanted to 4 add something. 5 I think I agree with your points about the importance of pre-initiator and initiating events. 6 7 It's been demonstrated and illustrated in lots of 8 analyses of operational events. It's been discussed 9 widely in the literature. Most people recognize that. The problem is that we don't understand it 10 fully yet. It's a research topic in the HRA program. 11 12 It's a research topic in the human factors program. In a moment, if Jay Persensky wants to say something 13 14 about that, that would be appropriate. 15 The point is that HRA is an engineering discipline. We take, borrow, use information that is 16 available from other disciplines and then apply it to 17 HRA and PRA. If that base knowledge is not there, we 18 19 can't use it yet. 20 Since this is a research area, we're not 21 really ready to address it in the way that you would 22 like us to at this point in time. I mean, it's on the 23 It's latent failures. HRA program. 24 MEMBER ROSEN: And I understand that, 25 I understand that completely. I think it is Susan.

an opportunity because many people will learn from this document who are coming into this area of analysis, will learn what to do. And they will also learn what needs yet to be done. And I think because of that second point, it's important to say what is not covered by this document but, yet, needs to be.

MS. COOPER: I think I agree with you. The other thing, the other point that I wanted to make is that what you are talking about, taking a step closer to being more realistic, more consistent with real accidents, I think that almost is going to mean a change not only in HRA but in PRA in the way that we define PRA.

I mean, PRA has been a snapshot over time of what the plant probably would look like at any point in time, but there is lots of averaging of things. There is averaging over equipment conditions, averaging over operating conditions, averaging over operating crews and how they do things.

When you start talking about things like emerging conditions or degraded conditions, now we're sort of focusing in on some things that could happen at small pockets of time. And that has sort of changed the definition of the PRA, but I agree at any point in time that's what could be happening.

1	But I think that's something that is going
2	to be a larger question. I mean, we are already
3	having some of that discussion with Gareth Parry over
4	in NRR over some things that we have been talking
5	about with ATHEANA and other second generation methods
6	because we are kind of pushing to change the
7	definition of PRA, but it's a bigger question.
8	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: I think what we are
9	saying, though, is make it clear in a statement here
10	what you just said, that this is not because a lot
11	of people, the vast majority, actually, when they say
12	"HRA," they understand, you know, after they initiate
13	or what do people do.
14	And by making it clear that maybe there
15	aren't any good like in the O&M. You know, there
16	aren't any good practices perhaps that you can put in
17	there. Make it clear that there is this other area
18	that is a research area and something
19	MS. LOIS: Probably we should add the
20	statement in the scope,
21	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Yes, yes, yes.
22	MS. LOIS: where we clarify
23	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Make people sensitive
24	to the fact that there are these other things that
25	need some exploration.

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1	MS. LOIS: Fair enough.
2	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: That's all.
3	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: George, are you going to
4	finish on time?
5	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: I am. You're not
6	walking out. I don't know about Erasmia. You have 17
7	minutes.
8	MS. LOIS: I have 17 minutes.
9	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Let me tell you I
10	think
11	MS. LOIS: Seven explanatory?
12	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: your Appendix C
13	really doesn't do justice to what you have done. I
14	mean, based on what you told us here, I mean, you are
15	really summarizing a lot of stuff.
16	It would have been nice to quote some
17	people and say how you I mean, essentially what you
18	are saying, you are making sweeping statements. I
19	mean, most of these guys, points of clarification, we
20	did. Thank you. Be a little more okay.
21	Where are you now, 8?
22	MS. LOIS: I could just walk through. A
23	better way to go is to have the Committee to ask
24	questions of this, summarize all
25	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Well, let me tell you

1 what the major -- the "major." It's not major, but 2 the other stuff here is -- this issue of peer review, 3 the Committee didn't mean to send this document to 4 people and leave it up to their kindness to respect, 5 which appears to be what you have done. Peer review can take many forms. 6 And this 7 agency has a long record in all reforms used one time 8 or another. I mean, this is not NUREG-1150. 9 not worth the expense and all that stuff that they did 10 there. this Committee cannot 11 Now. qet into management issues, you know, how many resources you 12 have to do it and all of that. But let's take the 13 14 whole man's approach so it doesn't cost you very much. 15 You have a group, say, of two or three 16 domestic experts who are well-known. They have done 17 work on models other than ATHEANA. And you are asking them to serve on a peer review panel because they are 18 19 good citizens without pay. 20 But there will be a meeting in Washington 21 on such and such a date where the group will come in. 22 They will have their comments. They will be briefed 23 by the staff on what the good practices document is. 24 And then they are expected to write their comments,

and the staff would respond.

25

1 The moment you say there will be a meeting in Washington with a group, those guys will feel 2 obligated to read the document in detail and give you 3 4 comments, even though they are not getting paid. 5 If you just send it to them and say, "Tell us what you think," I don't know that they will take 6 7 the time. In fact, I know one of them did not. happened to see one guy and say, "What happened?" 8 He said, "Well, they sent it to me. 9 really didn't have time to do it." 10 11 So why? Why not do something like that? 12 In other words, give it a more formal flavor so that you're forcing people to actually spend the time and 13 14 put their name there and send you something in detail. 15 MS. LOIS: We believe we accomplish that because the industry -- if you look at the HRA, at 16 least domestic HRA petitioners, most of them work for 17 industry. There are probably a couple in 18 the And they do not interact as much. 19 academia. 20 industry paid very close attention to it. And they 21 did. 22 provide of Thev comments, course, complained a little bit they are going to be de facto 23 24 requirements, et cetera. And we clarified that this

is a reference guide, et cetera, et cetera.

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But they

1	also came in and they explained. They provided some
2	specific comments on how we can improve the practices.
3	Also probably it will help if I explained
4	what we're going to do in phase two.
5	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Okay.
6	MS. LOIS: We are focusing on the methods
7	that are used by the industry: FAIR, ASEP, the
8	calculator that Sandia has been developing, et cetera.
9	So what we do is we are going to ask
10	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Let me understand
11	this. Why? Why are you focusing only on what the
12	industry is doing?
13	MS. LOIS: Let me explain our approach,
14	and then we will come.
15	Okay. This year we would like to address
16	the HRA method capability and evaluation with respect
17	to good practices because what we are doing is we
18	establish guidance for the industry.
19	And the applications that we see are not
20	we haven't seen a MERMOS application. We haven't
21	seen a CAR application. Licensees are primarily using
22	the calculator, which encompasses the causal method,
23	FAIR, ASEP, and HCR, the EPRI methods.
24	In addition, we would like to evaluate our
25	methods, ATHEANA and SPAR human reliability. So we

1 the process of contracting Scientech to 2 evaluate ATHEANA and SPAR. MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: 3 And SPAR? 4 MS. LOIS: SPAR. So that we give it to an 5 independent reviewer our methods. We're reviewing the methods that we're very familiar with, SHARP, et 6 7 cetera, past the calculator that EPRI is going to give 8 it to us. 9 And then we are going to have this meeting 10 where when we meet, we are going to debate our critique and try to come into the agreement as to why 11 we disagree, et cetera. 12 So that is some kind of a peer review in 13 14 the way you recommend here, but it's on a deeper level on the actual method level and quantification and 15 16 modeling, as opposed to this. 17 I mean, Jeb Julius, for example, in the calculator I'm pretty sure whatever we have here is 18 19 good practices. He's having them incorporated as an 20 EPRI good practices. SHARP that had been developed 25 21 years ago had, you know, the basis. The best one of 22 these good practices, you can find one in SHARP. 23 thing is that nobody was using it. You know, the 24 aging years, give me a number, and everyone would

produce a number and forget the overall framework on

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1	how you should treat this number into PRA.
2	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Erasmia, you're eating
3	up your time. I thought we were here to evaluate this
4	NUREG document and you were here to tell us why it is
5	a good one.
6	MS. LOIS: I'm responding.
7	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Is that what you're
8	doing or are you
9	MS. LOIS: I'm sorry. I'm responding to
10	George's question.
11	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: No, no.
12	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Is that the purpose of
13	our meeting?
14	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: We recommended in our
15	previous letter that they undergo a peer review, and
16	they didn't. They just
17	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: They didn't. We can't
18	spend all the time on that.
19	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Well, I'm saying the
20	rest of it's
21	MEMBER ROSEN: Well, I have one other
22	comment that I'd like to make on the prior slide that
23	is not related to peer review, 8. Eight. Just go up
24	and click on 8 on the left-hand.
25	MS LOIS: Ves

1 MEMBER ROSEN: Now, this one about 2 industry's expressed concerns with GPs becoming de 3 facto requirements and for including the 4 practices related to errors of commission. I think the section 6 in the document on 5 errors of commission is entirely appropriate. 6 7 of consideration, errors of commission is an important unaddressed weakness of current PRA that results I 8 think in universal understatement of real risk. 9 The classic cognitive error followed by an 10 of commission scenario; for example, 11 error doing the right things for the wrong 12 operators accident, they just don't know an accident theory. 13 14 They do all of the right things, but they have lost 15 the bubble. Cognitive error really takes them down a road where they perform errors of commission. 16 the Three Mile Island scenario among others. 17 And I think that to the extent that we 18 19 continue to say we're doing HRA without having errors of commission included, we're kidding ourselves. 20 21 want to support very strongly your point of view on 22 that. 23 I've taken the time to write down my 24 And I'll be happy to provide them to you.

Okay.

Thank you.

MS. LOIS:

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1 MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Okay. Why don't you 2 go over the rest of your slides and just point out 3 what you think is important? You don't have to go 4 over in detail. 5 Do you want to go to the slide mode on the 6 left, lower left? Yes. It's that. No. The other 7 one. Go up to the slide show. No, no. You've lost 8 the whole thing now. "ACRS Presentation." There it 9 is. 10 MS. LOIS: I'm sorry. I'm not using a PC in my office, and I'm not very --11 12 MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: "ACRS Presentation" on the right there at the bottom. Right. All the way 13 14 right. Down. Bottom, bottom. No, no. Cancel. 15 Right, right. 16 Anyway, we have the hard copy. So we can 17 keep going until someone comes to help. 18 MS. LOIS: Okay. If we talk on page 9, 19 the need, clarify the need of the document, again, we 20 state that this supports the req quide we want to have 21 and missed others, clarifies who should use it is the 22 NRC staff for evaluating human reliability analysis, 23 concerns about de facto requirements. We clarified 24 that this is not a standard we support, standard 25 activities. But then the level of --

CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Well, let's look at 1 2 I'm sorry. You say it's for internal use by 3 NRC staff. Was there any evaluation about whether or 4 not the staff found this useful? 5 MS. LOIS: We had the document. First of all, it was developed with the interaction of NRR PRA 6 7 members. And the initial activity, it was this 8 activity was initiated on NRR request. They said, "If 9 you would like to do something useful, the Office of 10 Research should develop а quidance for reliability." 11 12 So there is some CHAIRMAN WALLIS: evidence that it answers sort of the concerns that 13 14 they had? 15 MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Well, they would use 16 it presumably the next year or so. And they would 17 pass judgment. I mean, this is the first --18 CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Okay. That is how the whole 19 MS. LOIS: Yes. 20 activity started out. There was a comment from the 21 industry-wide. It's not tied to the category 22 capabilities of the ASME standard. And we believe 23 that we shouldn't because this is the analyst actually should decide which one of the good practices should 24 25 apply, as opposed to have the categories.

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There was a comment from an individual that came in. And he says a lack of sufficient input from the broader set of stakeholders and expressing a doubt whether or not the offers are good enough, have the capability to develop such documents, and, again, we're stating that this is not a standard and the IEEE has HRA standard initiatives, but we believe that we have long and strong HRA experience developing methods, performing the PRAs. And also the authors have worked in the industry all through the years, et again, used the for cetera, and, peer review soliciting comments.

These comments incorporating experience, operating experience, came from the international as well as domestic reviewers. I think that touches Mr. Rosen's concern about incorporation of organizational factors in the HRA.

What we do here is we modify the text. It's not in your version, but we're doing it. of databases and historical recommend the use minimum for identifying as identifying pre-initiators and for important performance-shaping factors. However, we believe that we need to do more work on establishing methods on how you can use operational experience to quantify.

1	On errors of commission, we had specific
2	recommendations on how to better improve the guidance
3	there. And we have done it. Also, we have had some
4	complaints about it's too resource-demanding to
5	incorporate errors of commissions.
6	We note here that the NRC experience, at
7	least with the PTS work, shows that it's not as much.
8	And also there are some tools out there that would
9	help that.
10	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: That's an irrelevant
11	issue. It's important to safety. I mean, you can't
12	have an HRA good practice document and ignore
13	something that is important because it is too
14	resource-demanding. I mean, your answer should have
15	been "We don't care."
16	I'm sorry. If it's safety-related, you
17	know
18	MS. LOIS: But, in actuality I don't
19	know. Susan may speak more to it. But, in actuality,
20	it does not seem to be
21	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: What?
22	MS. COOPER: Just enjoying your joke.
23	MEMBER ROSEN: Well, I think what George
24	is saying is it's very important. If we could claim
25	to really be trying to estimate the likelihood of

1	human failure during an event or before an event, we
2	have to do it.
3	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: My goodness.
4	MS. COOPER: I agree. But if they haven't
5	figured it out, then, you know
6	MEMBER ROSEN: That's different.
7	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: If we are not ready
8	to put it in the good practices document, that's an
9	entirely different thing. But to say it's
10	resource-intensive, yes.
11	MEMBER POWERS: But the other clause in
12	there says, "not necessary." Now, why would somebody
13	say that? I mean, it did say
14	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: You're right.
15	MEMBER POWERS: "not necessary." I
16	mean, why did they say, "not necessary"? I mean,
17	there must have been some thought behind that.
18	MS. LOIS: And what we are stating in the
19	document is that it may be very necessary in lieu of
20	the applicants that licensees have for risk-informed
21	
22	MEMBER POWERS: Sure. But what I am
23	struggling with is why would somebody say it's not
24	necessary? I mean, it's not
25	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Did that person give

1	any
2	MEMBER POWERS: The possibility goes with
3	Mr. Rosen's comment. I mean, he may be a little more
4	extreme than many, but he says, "You're not doing HRA
5	unless you do errors of commission."
6	This other fellow was saying, "Well, it's
7	not even necessary to do that." I mean, that seems to
8	be the two poles of the debate here.
9	I understand Mr. Rosen's position. It
10	seems very plausible. The one that says it's not
11	necessary is striking in that it is so
12	counterintuitive.
13	There must have been some thought behind
14	it. What was that thought?
15	MS. LOIS: Traditionally it hasn't been
16	incorporated. That's one reason for one to believe.
17	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: But did this person
18	justify the statement?
19	MS. LOIS: Alan, can you help me here?
20	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: You don't have to
21	defend it yourself. I mean, we are just asking.
22	MS. LOIS: Yes. Alan may be more familian
23	with
24	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Do you know, Alan?
25	MR. KOLACZKOWSKI: No. I can't see why

1 someone would make such a comment in light of what we 2 know today. I really can't provide any rationale for having said what they said, but that's what they said. 3 4 We don't think that we should be trying to 5 address errors of commission yet. It's not mature process, whatever. 6 enough It's too 7 resource-intensive, et cetera. Why they said that, 8 you'd have to ask them. 9 MEMBER POWERS: I can well imagine a basis 10 I would come in and say, "No. Don't worry 11 about errors of commission because the operators will 12 follow their procedures and only do what the procedures tell them to do. And all you have to do is 13 14 worry about what they leave out. They're well-trained 15 in this aspect, and there is no reason to think that 16 they will go beyond that training and start doing things that are not called for in the procedures. 17 That's how I would justify making that --18 19 CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Unless they misdiagnose 20 and follow the wrong procedure, which was Steve's 21 point. 22 MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Unless the context 23 leads them in to --CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Leads them into the 24 25 wrong --

1	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: The context.
2	MEMBER ROSEN: Then they do exactly the
3	right things. They do the right thing.
4	DR. DENNING: Let me jump in and say
5	MEMBER POWERS: But with symptom-oriented
6	procedures, they won't do that.
7	DR. DENNING: The question is
8	MEMBER ROSEN: This debate is getting
9	interesting now, Dana.
10	DR. DENNING: The question is, what is the
11	application of the PRA? If the intent is to gain
12	insights, which I think is the primary value from PRA,
13	then you may not have to do this. The real question
14	is human factors and do you undertake symptom-based
15	procedures and things like that.
16	There are limitations as to what one can
17	really do with HRA. And some of those are
18	fundamental, and we will never be able to really do
19	errors of commission really well.
20	The issue that I see of great concern is
21	I think the Commission right now is going down a path
22	of believing bottom-line numbers of PRA to a higher
23	degree than they should.
24	Now, it's ingrained in our risk-informed
25	regulations as long as we adequately account for

1 uncertainties in those risk-informing, then it's okay 2 if we semi-believe these numbers. 3 I think that there is an application that 4 is occurring of PRA where people are really believing 5 these bottom-line numbers I think to a greater degree than they should. 6 7 Now, that doesn't mean that we shouldn't delve further into HRA, which is one of the weak 8 9 elements of PRA, but there are limitations as to how much we can believe those HRA numbers ever. 10 There are limitations as to how much we can believe the 11 bottom-line PRA numbers ever. 12 And I think the big question is, are we 13 14 going too far in using PRA in our risk-informed 15 regulations? I think it's a valid question and one that we have seen raised recently in the press, one we 16 have to look at first. 17 So that is a reason why one might say, 18 19 "You really don't have to go to great detail in HRA." 20 It's a matter of how you're going to use the results 21 of the PRA. 22 CHAIRMAN WALLIS: George, can you finish 23 up in a very few minutes? Well, first of 24 MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Yes. 25 all, I'd like to note that all members agree with Dr.

1	Denning that the Commission is going too far.
2	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: So you are a believer,
3	are you, George?
4	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: I do not believe we
5	are going too far. And, Erasmia, can you finish it in
6	33 seconds? You don't have to go line by line.
7	MS. LOIS: This is the last slide.
8	MEMBER BONACA: We should, however, pick
9	up this issue a little bit later, sometime tomorrow
10	afternoon.
11	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: That's fine with me,
12	yes.
13	MEMBER BONACA: It's very important, I
14	think.
15	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Sure. It's very
16	important.
17	MS. LOIS: I think the net slide, we are
18	saying that we had some specific comments and we
19	address.
20	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: All right.
21	MS. LOIS: I finish in
22	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: So you are going to
23	issue this NUREG?
24	MS. LOIS: We are going to issue the NUREG
25	to consider whether or not we can add a paragraph in

1	this where it would verify the
2	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Is there any way
3	my last comment is, again, you said that you will
4	interact with the industry in methods that they have
5	used and all of that.
6	Maybe it's my background, but this bothers
7	me. Is there any way to involve the whole community
8	out there? Why do you assume that just because a
9	utility used the method, it deserves your attention,
10	but if a professor did something, it does not?
11	MS. LOIS: No, I didn't say that.
12	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: But you said that you
13	are going to interact with industry in the methods
14	that they are using. If somebody has not used a
15	method, then it's outside your scope.
16	And it does bother me. And you say nobody
17	has submitted anything to the NRC involving MERMOS.
18	Why should they? I mean, that's a French approach.
19	But in your approach, you should try to
20	understand what all of these guys have been doing and
21	make sure that you are on top of the game. So, you
22	know, that's really the issue here. It's not
23	reviewing MERMOS' or anybody else's method.
24	MS. COOPER: I think, George, it is a
25	question of resources and priorities. I mean, our

1 customer, if you will, the person who asked us to 2 initiate this effort, is NRR. They're responsible for 3 reviewing license applications. And so it's of their 4 interest, their interest that we first look at the 5 methods that they're seeing and applications. that's really why we're beginning there. 6 7 I think it is Erasmia's intent that we 8 will eventually look at some other methods as well. 9 MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Okay. 10 MS. COOPER: And we hope that we will involve some of the people over internationally. 11 mentioned that there has been some interest over the 12 years from --13 14 MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Closing comment 15 because we really have to finish it. 16 MS. COOPER: Yes. 17 MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: What really bothers me is that every time I go to a meeting like the 18 19 workshop in Brussels, people stand up and say, "My 20 model does this. My model does that." You're 21 wondering, do these people read each other's papers? 22 Do they read each other's documents? Why is it "My 23 model this" and the NRC's model is that? At some 24 point we have to stop this. 25 Thank you very much. Any other comments

1	from the Committee?
2	(No response.)
3	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Back to you, Mr.
4	Chairman.
5	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: I'd like to know what we
6	are going to do with this. Would you like a letter?
7	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: No. They said no.
8	MS. LOIS: We did not ask for a letter.
9	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: It's information.
10	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: So this is just for
11	information purposes?
12	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Yes.
13	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: So we're not going to
14	write a letter on this?
15	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: We will have to
16	discuss that. They are not requesting a letter, but
17	
18	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: I was wondering if we
19	did write a letter, Erasmia, how could we add some
20	value to this since you already
21	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: We're adding value by
22	not writing a letter.
23	(Laughter.)
24	MEMBER SIEBER: We're here to help you.
25	MS. LOIS: I guess it will add value in
I	

1	the sense that this is just step number one in
2	developing the reg guidance.
3	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: So it might not value in
4	looking to the next step?
5	MS. LOIS: That's right.
6	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Thank you. Well, now
7	that's the end of this.
8	MS. LOIS: Thank you very much.
9	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Thank you for lasting
10	and giving us the benefit of your observations.
11	MS. LOIS: Thank you.
12	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: We have the next thing
13	on our schedule to look at what we are going to say
14	this afternoon. I need to go and collect my
15	documents. Maybe some of you do, too.
16	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Yes.
17	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: So let's go away and
18	come back as soon as possible. And we will look at
19	what we are going to say this afternoon.
20	(Whereupon, at 11:27 a.m., the foregoing
21	matter was adjourned.)
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